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The Marine Corps operates a Depot Level Maintenance Program (DLMP) to 
support the continued operation of principal end items.  Principal end items require 
periodic induction into the DLMP.  This maintenance consists of major systems 
overhauls aimed at extending the life cycle of the principal end item.  The frequency of 
these inductions is different for each end item.  The number of systems requiring 
induction into Depot Level Maintenance in a given year is always greater than the 
funding available in that year resulting in a constraint.  The Marine Corps has attempted 
to optimize the utility received from the DLMP through the use of a model that takes a 
number of variables into consideration resulting in a schedule for end-items to be 
inducted into the DLMP.  This model makes the most efficient use of available funding 
by creating the largest increase in readiness reporting possible given the constrained 
budget.  The changing operational requirements in light of current conflicts and future 
operations tempo have made the current DLMP process problematic.  This project 
proposes to analyze the current process, to include the DERO model, the relationship 
between the DERO model and the DLMP, and the “human factor” decisions that go into 
the final implementation and execution of the DLMP.  The expected product from this 
project is a recommendation to Marine Corps Systems Command and Marine Corps 
Logistics Command on a process that improves the DLMP over the long run, given the 
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The United States Marine Corps Depot Level Maintenance Program (DLMP) is a 
system of interconnected and dynamic processes which, when combined, are intended to 
maximize equipment readiness.  The three essential functions of the DLMP include 
identifying and validating the maintenance work to be accomplished via a requirements 
determination process, identifying who can perform the maintenance on the requirements, 
and establishing a program execution framework in order to report status and identify 
cost, schedule, and performance metrics.  Since the goal of this project is to improve one 
specific part of the DLMP system, we will not address several of the peripheral processes 
included in the overall DLMP.  The aspect of the DLMP that this report will focus on is 
the DLMP requirements determination process. 
The current DLMP requirements determination process was used for the first time 
in 1998 for Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) 2000.  Prior to 1990, the Marine 
Corps maintained adequate rotational and out of service stocks of Principal End Items 
(PEI) to simultaneously satisfy the operational requirements of the operating forces and 
maintain depot skills and capability.  However, due to diminishing financial resources 
and competing priorities, the depot maintenance program required increased scrutiny of 
requirements.  Therefore, the DLMP requirements determination process was studied to 
develop alternatives, institutionalize and modify improvements, and examine other 
models and business case tools that would objectively quantify decisions and 
recommendations made to senior leadership both internal and external to the Marine 
Corps.  This process of objective quantification by achieving shareholder consensus 
through the use of warfighting values and operational availability optimization in a 
constrained resource environment via the Dynamic Equipment Repair Optimization 
(DERO) model is a matter of  much contention. 
 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this project is to offer methods to increase the efficiency and level 
of stakeholder satisfaction in the current DLMP requirements determination process.  
 2
This project seeks to offer alternatives that may be implemented to improve the current 
DERO model based requirements determination process and alternatives to the DERO 
model based requirements determination process that are both more easily understood by 
the DLMP stakeholders and applicable to both the requirements determination and 
execution processes.  Currently, the DERO based requirements determination system is a 
strategic method to support the Marine Corps’ POM process (i.e. requirements 
determination).  While one could argue that DERO accomplishes this objective, it does 
not translate well to DLMP execution.  As the I Marine Expeditionary Force Maintenance 
Management Officer described using DERO during DLMP execution, “It’s like using a 
strategic tool to solve a tactical problem.” 
 
B. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Congressional Appropriations Committees’ questioning of the credibility of the 
Services’ forecast of depot maintenance requirements in conjunction with the Fiscal Year 
1989 Budget resulted in the Defense Resources Board identifying the requirement for a 
detailed assessment of depot maintenance requirements and the relationship of funding 
levels to readiness and sustainability (O’Malley, T. J. and Bachman, Tovey C., 1990).  
An examination of several years of Air Force budgets in the late 1980s revealed that 
POM estimates of Air Force depot maintenance requirements were overstated when 
compared to actual obligations, that overstating requirements diminishes confidence in 
the requirements determination process, and that cuts in depot maintenance funding had 
little to no discernible effect on readiness rates.  The authors explain the overstating of 
depot maintenance resource requirements by comparing the requirements provided in the 
POM submission with the resources provided by Congressional Appropriations and 
corresponding obligations.  Between Fiscal Years 1980 through 1988, obligations 
exceeded POM submissions in five years and POM submissions exceeded obligations in 
four years.  The given reasons for cuts in depot maintenance not having a discernible 
effect on readiness rates has to do with how the Air Force manages its parts inventory.  
Essentially, parts inventories are maintained in two channels.  One channel supports 
actual peacetime training with parts maintained at one of five maintenance depots while 
the other channel supports predicted wartime requirements, or War Readiness Spares Kits 
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(WRSK).  When peacetime training parts inventories were exhausted, material managers 
treated the WRSK as safety stock and inducted those parts into the depot maintenance 
process.  This combining of the two parts inventories resulted in actual depot 
maintenance resource requirements being distorted and ultimately unpredictable.  The 
lack of reliable predictions of peacetime depot maintenance resource requirements are 
due to a number of factors, the most obvious of which is changes in the flight hour 
program.  The authors recommend a modification of the currently used Aircraft 
Availability Model to better capture depot level maintenance requirements and the 
associated and supporting resource requirements. 
The U.S. Air Force uses a highly regimented flight hour program as a means to 
determine its depot maintenance resource requirements.  Operational commands use the 
flight hour program to predict what services they will require from the Depot 
Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG).  This prediction model requires strict adherence 
to specified flight hour programs (Air Force Materiel Command Instruction 21-128, 
1997).  As operational commands execute their flight hour programs, they use established 
average cost per flying hour metrics to predict how much of their annual budget they 
should apportion to the DMAG to support their aircraft readiness (Keating and Camm, 
2002).  The authors examine the continuous shortcomings that the Air Force Materiel 
Command encounters in providing the support and services to its operational customers.  
They report that Air Force Materiel Command’s expenditures on its DMAGs are 
inconsistent with flying hours across different platforms.  Keating and Camm hypothesize 
that DMAG expenditures are more complex than simply flying hours and can be broken 
down to two all encompassing representative groups, variable costs and fixed costs.  
Under their hypothesis, flight hour programs represent variable costs and represent an 
accurate predictor of only about forty-two percent of DMAG expenditures.  DMAG fixed 
costs have many categories, all with a high degree of variance.  The authors point out that 
programmed depot maintenance is scheduled in the POM years out from the current year 
and are therefore unrelated to current year operations.  This leads to unscheduled 
maintenance costs in the year of execution being attributable to variations in flight hour 
programs and therefore causes a negative correlation between flight hours and depot 
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maintenance requirements determination.  Long lead times in spare parts procurement 
(sometimes causing demand or delivery to occur years after the obligation), overhead, 
and specifics of the government employed civilian labor force all contribute to DMAG 
fixed costs that are unrelated to flight hour programs.  While the substance of this 
literature is solely the relationship of flight hours to DMAG resource determination, the 
suggestion that DMAG funding can be broken down into fixed and variable costs could 
contribute to a better understanding of the many, and often conflicting, depot level 
maintenance requirements determination aspects.  
The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that services are overstating their 
depot maintenance requirements (General Accounting Office, 1995).  The report briefly 
describes the Air Force and Navy requirements determination process and contrasts their 
differences.  Both models operate on a prediction methodology based on requirements 
drivers to determine depot maintenance resource requirements.  In reporting that the 
services are overstating their depot maintenance requirements, the GAO uses 
demonstrable evidence to prove that obligations from the depot maintenance funding 
appropriations were significantly less than what was originally submitted in the POM.  In 
budget years ’93, ’94, and ’95, the services’ stated depot maintenance backlog decreased 
by $288 million, $216 million, and $730 million respectively between the times that the 
budgets were submitted and the appropriations were signed.  Between 1993 and 1995 the 
services received about $516 million more than requested for depot level maintenance.  
Service officials acknowledge that all funds received for depot maintenance are not 
necessarily used for that purpose.  The report goes on to give valid explanations for the 
discrepancies.  In general, depot maintenance backlogs, and corresponding requirements, 
tend to decrease during the year of budget execution.  After the 1995 budget submission, 
an Army restructuring initiative was approved that resulted in the phasing out of older 
helicopters from the Army inventory.  This resulted in a significant movement of assets 
from the unfunded to the funded category of depot maintenance requirements.  At the 
beginning of fiscal year 1994, the Air Force’s Air Combat Command depot maintenance 
backlog was $130 million.  Throughout the year, the Air Force divested itself of 
numerous aging B-52s and F-111s, resulting in a depot maintenance backlog of only $60 
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million.  This force reduction decreased the depot maintenance requirements for these 
aircraft and allowed other aircraft to move from the unfunded list to the funded list, 
decreasing the depot maintenance backload.  It becomes clear that there is a distinct 
disconnect between depot maintenance requirements determination and depot 
maintenance execution.  The report recommends several Congressional oversight controls 
to mitigate the effects caused by a lack of distinction between depot maintenance 
requirements determination and execution.     
 
C. SUMMARY OF DIRECTIVE GUIDANCE AND BACKGROUND 
RESEARCH 
The following section includes a brief synopsis of all directives and published 
information relative to the Marine Corps’ DLMP and its requirements determination 
process.  These synopses are included in order to provide the reader with a framework 
from which to understand the institutional goals and methodology of the Marine Corps’ 
DLMP.      
During 1997 the Analytical Systems Engineering Corporation (ASEC) was 
commissioned by the United States Marine Corps to execute a study of the DLMP 
(ASEC, 1998).  Specifically, ASEC was commissioned to develop a process and 
methodology by which the unconstrained list of PEI’s requiring depot repair can best be 
aligned to warfighting capability, evaluated using best business life cycle management 
principals, prioritized for depot level repair, and support a balanced and reasonable 
projection of the highest priority mission essential ground equipment needs that are 
adjusted for business and management considerations of the Marine Corps.  While the 
scope of the ASEC study is much larger than the concentration of this MBA project, 
many topics and ideas are overlapping and interrelated.  Recommendations and 
conclusions offered by the study specifically related to the DLMP requirements 
determination process include: 
(1)       That at the time of the study the DLMP process did not have sufficient 
formalized publications and directives. 
(2)       That Mission Areas be discontinued as the primary linkage between 
maintenance priorities and warfighting utility.  Mission Areas correlate the 
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degree of use of equipment with where that equipment is assigned and the 
assigned unit’s mission as stated in current operations plans. 
(3)       That Scenario Based Processes be automated, implemented and executed 
to link maintenance priorities and warfighting values with other variables 
such as pacing items, current operational posture, readiness and rotation 
programs.  Scenario Based Processes correlate the degree of use of 
equipment with likely combat scenarios considering real world situations. 
(4)       That Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and 
Program Managers take a more active role in the DLMP process. 
Marine Corps Order 4790.19, subject DEPOT MAINTENANCE POLICY, 
publishes the Marine Corps policy for depot maintenance.  The mission of the Marine 
Corps depot maintenance policy is to provide depot maintenance support to the operating 
forces and to maintain an optimum state of contract, organic and interservice depot 
maintenance in support of the Marine Corps force structure and mobilization plans.  Of 
particular note, this Order’s concept of operations states that the Order does not prescribe 
total Marine Corps policy for depot maintenance; rather it contains only those policies 
essential to an integrated management system.  As the reader should understand from this 
report, the operational level of the Marine Corps DLMP experiences policy conflict in 
determining to exactly what ends the integrated management system is intended to 
achieve.  Said another way, in a constrained resource environment, conflict is created by 
the competing demands for limited resources intended to accomplish both operational 
availability of Marine Corps ground equipment and the support of capabilities and 
infrastructure of the maintenance depots. 
Marine Corps Order 4400.193, subject MARINE CORPS STRATIFICATION OF 
PRINCIPAL END ITEM (PEI STRAT) PROCESS POLICY, establishes policy, 
responsibilities, and authority associated with the PEI Strat process.  The PEI Strat 
process is used by DC, I&L to assess Marine Corps ground equipment asset posture 
against requirements as defined by the Commanding General, MCSC.  A key element of 
the PEI Strat process is that it is used in the POM development process for DC, P&R.  
Generally, the difference between the logistics data (i.e. operational availability) 
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contained in the PEI Strat process and the current and forecasted requirements placed on 
Marine Corps ground equipment assets is used to develop POM initiatives which, in turn, 
result in Legislation authorizing and appropriating programs such as the DLMP.  
Specifically, the PEI Strat process is used in support of: 
(1) Allowance visibility 
(2) Asset visibility 
(3) Materiel capability (readiness / sustainment) 
(4) Depot Level Maintenance Program 
(5) POM development/budget execution 
(6) Combat Development Process 
(7) Force structure development and review 
(8) Wargaming 
(9) Modeling / “what if” scenarios 
(10)Distribution of assets throughout the Marine Corps 
All supply class VII (principal end items) and II (Individual Clothing and Combat 
Equipment (ICCE)) items required by the Marine Corps are included in the PEI Strat 
process. 
Marine Corps Order 4400.194, subject MARINE CORPS CLASS VII STOCK 
ROTATION POLICY is a key reference in Marine Corps Order 4790.19, subject DEPOT 
MAINTENANCE POLICY.  Complimenting the depot maintenance policy, the stock 
rotation policy is designed to enhance readiness, prolong service life, and achieve the full 
use of assets prior to disposal by helping commanders facilitate the rotation of selected 
principal end items while preserving the strategic capability of the prepositioning 
programs.    The stock rotation policy model states that equipment in using units, such as 
operational units, that receives the most usage should be rotated with available equipment 
which receives considerably less usage (e.g. administrative storage/deadlines, 
prepositioned stocks, etc.).  A centrally planned and coordinated stock rotation policy 
achieves its goal by rotating new or reconditioned equipment to replace worn equipment, 
and by spreading usage equally among all equipment.  Properly executed, the stock 
rotation policy should serve as one way to optimize the DLMP by capitalizing on 
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economies of scale as greater numbers of PEIs age concurrently and become candidates 
for depot level maintenance.  The current DLMP requirements determination process 
accounts for principal end items subject to any rotation policy (e.g. the Replacement and 
Evacuation Program (R&E), Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), Midlife Rebuild 
Program, and the Product Improvement Program (PIP)).  
 
D. DLMP REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The DLMP process owner is the Supply Chain Management Center, Marine 
Corps Logistics Command.  Stakeholders in the DLMP include: Deputy Commandant, 
Installations and Logistics (DC, I&L); Deputy Commandant, Programs and Resources 
(DC, P&R); Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Command (MCLC); Commander, 
Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC); and the non-aviation operating forces.  
The requirements determination process begins with a decision support system 
called the Materiel Capability Decision Support System (MCDSS).  The MCDSS is a 
data warehouse which functions to capture several dynamic logistics metrics related to 
PEI operational availability and produce PEI Stratification sheets.  PEI Stratification 
sheets provide a synopsis of equipment requirements balanced against on-hand assets and 
display the status, location, and operational availability posture of PEIs at a particular 
point in time in a prioritized sequence.  The MCDSS draws its dynamic information from 
Marine Corps boss files.  Boss files include various automated data sources such as: 
(1) Logistics Management Information System (LMIS) 
(2) Stock Control System (SCS) 
(3) Marine Corps Ground Equipment Readiness Reporting (MCGERR) 
Logistics metrics related to PEI operational availability included in the MCDSS 
include: 
(1) Unserviceable PEIs held in depot stores 
(2) PEI Stratification projection of future unserviceable items using nine quarters 
of unserviceable return history 
(3) Program Manager (PM) established rotation programs 
(4) PM scheduled rebuilds and mid-life overhauls 
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(5) Depot level Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP) 
(6) Scheduled depot level maintenance 
The PEI Stratification process begins the requirements determination process by 
relating PEI systems to requirements in a readiness (i.e. operational availability) 
prioritized sequence and depicting what, if any, depot maintenance action needs to be 
taken to support the PEI.  Stratification includes only the current fiscal year’s portion of 
the LMIS Equipment Allowance File (EAF) and includes planned allowances through the 
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).  The PEI Stratification process also accounts for 
Approved Acquisition Objectives (AAO) for PEI systems that are being replaced at the 
end of their service life.  The Depot Maintenance Float Allowance (DMFA) supports the 
DLMP.  The DMFA is a quantity of mission essential, maintenance significant equipment 
that is available in depot storage, and included in the AAO, which allows for exchange 
with out of depot stores deadlined equipment without detracting from a unit’s readiness 
condition and assigned mission capability. 
Once the Marine Corps Logistics Command Supply Chain Management Center 
has completed the PEI Stratification sheets, they are delivered to the DLMP stakeholders 
previously listed.  After the DLMP stakeholders have had an opportunity to review the 
PEI Stratification sheets produced by the MCDSS, they meet at a DLMP requirements 
conference for the purpose of reaching a consensus on the depot level maintenance 
requirements for each PEI.  In addition to achieving a consensus on requirements for each 
PEI, Program Managers provide a Statement of Work (SOW) that can be used to 
calculate an initial rough order of magnitude of the Direct Labor Hours (DLH) to perform 
the required work and a Bill of Materiel (BOM) for the necessary materiel to complete 
the work.  DLH and BOM costs are calculated to determine the total unit repair cost to be 
used in POM development. 
The next step in the requirements determination process is to assign numerical 
warfighting values for all PEIs designated for depot level maintenance.  This function is 
performed by DC, I&L.  Since the establishment and designation of warfighting values is  
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critical to the output of the next step in the requirements determination process, the 
DERO model itself, and serves as the basis for this report, we will cover this topic in 
greater detail later in the report. 
Once warfighting values have been assigned to the PEIs listed on the PEI 
Stratification sheets, a warfighting capabilities list results.  The warfighting capabilities 
list is simply the PEI Stratification sheets which include the warfighting values assigned 
to each group of PEIs.  Commander, MCLC is charged with selecting items from the 
warfighting capabilities list to be funded with the limited amount of money that will 
eventually be made available to support the DLMP program.  The selection is 
accomplished via the DERO optimization model and will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this report.  The DERO model considers the following important input factors: 
(1) Calculated equipment scores (i.e. from the warfighting capabilities list) 
(2) Current rotation programs identified by the Commander, MCSC 
(3) PEI Stratification 
(4) Commander, MCSC’s procurement initiatives and phase out plans  
(5) Allowance data establishing the USMC War Material Requirement 
(WMR)   
(6) Minimum PEI target operational availability percentages approved by 
Commander, MCLC 
(7) Tentative annual program budgets provided by DC, P&R 
Once the Commander, MCLC generates the DERO optimized list of PEIs selected 
for depot maintenance based on the above factors, particularly the constrained resource 
factor represented at factor (7), POM submissions are prepared for consideration by DC, 
P&R among competing resource interests and ultimately included in the Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS).  At the commencement of each fiscal year 
when Congress passes budget execution authority to the Marine Corps, Operation and 
Maintenance Marine Corps (OMMC) and Operation and Maintenance Marine Corps 
Reserve (OMMCR) funds are allocated to the Marine Corps Program Codes (MCPC) 
which support the DLMP. 
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II. DLMP REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS 
The authors were sponsored by Marine Corps Systems Command and Marine 
Corps Logistics Command to attend the Fiscal Year 2005 DLMP Requirements 
Determination Conference held at Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia during 
August, 2004.  The following paragraphs relate the insight the authors gained by 
attending the conference relative to DERO model implementation, warfighting values 
and their associated sensitivity to DERO model output, the role that repair costs play in 
DERO model based requirements determination, process inputs, process outputs and their 
associated use, format, and flexibility, and stakeholder dissatisfaction with the current 
process.  These insights give rise to our suggestions to improve the current DERO model 
based requirements determination process or use an alternate, utility based, requirements 
determination process.      
 
A. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS 
The Fiscal Year 2005 Off-Cycle DLMP Requirements Determination Conference 
was convened on 17 August, 2004 by the Supply Chain Management Center, Marine 
Corps Logistics Command and concluded on 20 August, 2004.  This DLMP cycle (i.e. 
the FY’05 Off Cycle) was convened specifically for the purpose of conducting DLMP 
requirements determination resulting from the $65.56 billion Congressional Defense 
Appropriation to support the Global War on Terrorism, of which $2.8 billion was 
specifically appropriated for Defense depot level maintenance.  Normally, these 
conferences are held only during POM planning (i.e. odd numbered) years.  Attendees at 
the conference included all DLMP stakeholders, specifically representatives from the 
following commands and activities: 
1. Marine Corps Logistics Command Supply Chain Management Center 
2. Marine Corps Logistics Command Studies and Analysis Department 
3. Marine Corps Systems Command Acquisitions and Product Support 
4. Marine Expeditionary Forces 
5. Marine Forces Reserve 
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6. Deputy Commandant, Programs and Resources 
7. Enhanced Equipment Allowance Pool, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat 
Center, Twentynine  Palms, California 
8. Program Groups responsible for life cycle management of like groups of 
principal end items 
9. Blount Island Command 
The first order of business was to provide attendees copies of the PEI 
Stratification sheets containing all PEIs under consideration.  Each PEI was briefed 
within the context of its program group by the representative from the Supply Chain 
Management Center.  As each PEI was briefed, any stakeholder could address 
information contained on the PEI stratification sheet for that PEI.  The most common 
issues raised as the meeting progressed through the PEI list were unserviceable returns 
and warfighting values (i.e. inputs to the DERO model that are most easily manipulated 
by the stakeholders).  It is important to note that stakeholders raised these issues in an 
attempt to assign important PEIs the weight required for the DERO model to pick them 
up as candidates for induction into depot level maintenance.   
 The beginnings of stakeholder dissatisfaction with the current process could be 
determined at this point.  As the nature of the DERO model based requirements 
determination operates on the principle of maximizing Marine Corps wide readiness 
levels in a constrained resource (i.e. budget) environment, some stakeholders will get 
their desired PEIs into the DERO output at the expense of other stakeholders not getting 
their PEIs funded.  This process naturally results in stakeholder conflict.  Marine 
Expeditionary Force Maintenance Management Officers desire to see the PEIs they deem 
as most important to their current operations given the highest weights on the DERO 
input variable scales.  Other activities, such as Blount Island Command (i.e. Maritime 
Prepositioning Forces) and the Enhanced Equipment Allowance Pool desire to see the 
same thing for their preferred PEIs.  Yet other groups, such as the individual Program 
Groups whose livelihoods depend on receiving business from the DLMP, are at odds and 
in competition with all the other program groups.  There are eight different program 
groups.  Finally, all M1A-2 main battle tanks on the PEI stratification sheets were 
 13
directly funded for depot level maintenance in a non-competitive nature by the program 
manager due to funding being specifically allocated to an Army maintenance depot which 
performs depot maintenance on the tanks.     
On 19 August the discussion of the individual PEIs on the PEI stratification sheets 
concluded and the representatives from the Marine Corps Logistics Command Studies 
and Analysis Department who run the DERO model were brought into the discussion.  
Changes from the original PEI stratification sheets resulting from the discussions of each 
of the PEIs were briefed to them.  They, in turn, took all the information from the 
previous three days of individual PEI discussions and began to input the data into the 
DERO model input variables.  Throughout the evening of 19 August, the two DERO 
model operators attempted to run the DERO model.  On thirteen separate occasions, the 
DERO model “crashed” and the operators had to recode portions of the program and/or 
data in an attempt to get the model to function properly. 
On the morning of 20 August, the final day of the conference, the DERO output 
was to have been briefed to all the assembled stakeholders.  When the model operators 
attempted to display the data on an overhead projector, no one in the room could interpret 
what they were seeing.  Questions began to arise about what the output data represented.  
Challenges were made by some stakeholders about the results of the DERO run based on 
what weights they had assigned to the input variables of several of the PEIs.  Discussions 
ensued between the conference hosts, Supply Chain Management Center, and the DERO 
operators, Studies and Analysis Department, regarding what input variables should and 
should not have gone into the DERO run and the manner in which the output was 
intended to be presented.  At the end of this conference segment which concluded the 
conference, the conference hosts decided that they would work more closely with Studies 
and Analysis Department on another DERO run and that they would e-mail the results 
out to the conference attendees the following week.  It was our sense that the DERO 
model had lost credibility.  For example, one participant joked that he thought DERO 




B. DERO MODEL 
When the authors first arrived at Marine Corps Logistics Command, they spent 
several hours meeting with the DERO model operators and talking about the internal 
workings of the DERO model.  With the exception of the five inputs discernible in the 
piecewise linear objective function, the DERO model requires forty-seven additional 
input variables including inputs from the rotations model.  For a detailed list of these 
inputs, refer to the DLMP Handbook cite.  When questioned by the authors about what 
some of the input variables meant, the operators replied that they had never used many of 
the variables and that in some cases they simply “zeroed out” inputs that they either did 
not receive information for or received information for that did not match the input 
variable requirements.   
In a joint discussion with representatives from both the Supply Chain 
Management Center and Studies and Analysis Department about the DLMP 
Requirements Determination Conference, representatives from the Supply Chain 
Management Center asked the Studies and Analysis Department to make iterative DERO 
runs of the FY’05 Off Cycle data in twenty million dollar increments.  The logic of this 
request is supported because Marine Corps resource managers frequently want to know 
what they could do if they were able to secure additional resources (e.g. “What should I 
send through DLMP if I had an additional $20 million?”).  In an attempt to apply this 
logic and support the request, the DERO operators manipulated the budget function of the 
DERO model to reflect twenty million dollars.  When the model ran, the output PEIs 
selected in the first twenty million dollar increment were removed from the PEI data set, 
and the DERO model was set to run again at twenty million dollars.  This process was 
repeated until all PEIs on the stratification list were included in the DERO output and no 
PEIs were left to fund/repair.  Six iterations at $20 million each were required to include 
all PEIs in the DERO output.  What the Supply Chain Management Center 
representatives were attempting to do was to produce a prioritized list of which PEIs to 
send to depot level maintenance from most important to least important (i.e. first to last).  
The authors pointed out that because DERO is an optimization model, the results from 
three runs at $20 million each would not match the results of one run at $60 million, nor 
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would the output results of any specific $20 million run be reflected in a prioritized 
manner.  The representatives acknowledged these points to be true, yet still insisted that 
the output data be presented in this manner because that was what the stakeholders 
expected to see. 
 
C. ISSUES WITH WARFIGHTING VALUES, REPAIR COST, AND OTHER 
INPUTS 
Warfighting values from the current DERO model based requirements 
determination process are derived from the current edition of the Marine Corps Bulletin 
3000 “Table of Marine Corps Ground Equipment Resource Reporting (MCGERR) 
Equipment.”  The warfighting values are 1, 2, 3, and 4 with 4 being the highest score (i.e. 
should influence DERO model output the most).  Every PEI listed on the PEI 
stratification sheets is assigned a warfighting value from one to four based on that PEI’s 
level of importance as reported in the Marine Corps Bulletin 3000.  The intent in 
assigning warfighting values to PEIs as a DERO model input is to make some PEIs more 
or less competitive than others thereby influencing DERO model output.  This is the 
reason that so much time was and is spent in DLMP requirements determination 
conferences assigning specific warfighting values to individual PEIs.   
It should be noted that the present warfighting values of one through four are 
ordinal numbers.  Ordinal numbers are used only for ranking (Keller and Warrack, 2003).  
These numbers do not imply that a ranking of four has twice the value of a ranking of two 
or four times the value of a ranking of one.  The DERO model ignores this fact and 
includes the ordinal warfighting values as a real-value scalar in its objective function. 
The ASEC study covered earlier (ASEC, 1998) included in its recommendations 
that varying quantitative warfighting capabilities be developed and that all PEIs be 
ranked by relative warfighting capabilities as a methodology to assign limited funding for 
depot level maintenance.  This methodology relates warfighting capability to the relative 
utility of depot level maintenance funding based on the principle of marginal utility.  The 
ASEC study recommends a system of three gradations to differentiate warfighting 
capabilities among all PEIs.  The authors present a similar methodology for assigning 
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quantitative warfighting capabilities but with a system of four gradations which will be 
explained in the next chapter.  Both the ASEC study and the methodology proposed by 
the authors provide for a means to further stratify the differences between warfighting 
values and to increase their relative effects on the DLMP requirements determination 
process over the current process.  Furthermore, the authors learned by attending the 
DLMP requirements determination conference and seeing the results that the present 
system of assigning warfighting values seems to have, in many cases, no bearing on 
DERO output.  That is to say that changing a PEI’s warfighting value from one to four 
may not necessarily alter the output of a specific DERO run when all other variables are 
held constant. 
 
D. DEFERENCE TO REPAIR COST 
The present DERO based requirements determination process optimizes readiness 
given a certain budget but with no consideration given to unit repair cost.  This 
methodology fails to consider the economic concept of marginal utility because unit 
repair cost is not an input variable to the DERO model.  Marginal cost and marginal 
benefit considerations could allow material managers to get a greater “bang for the buck” 
in readiness than the current DERO optimization model provides.  In a hypothetical 
example, DERO would choose to repair low density items to an acceptable level of 
readiness at the expense of all other higher density items assuming that the low density 
items had a sufficiently high unit repair cost relative to the depot maintenance budget.  
While DERO does exactly what it is intended to do, maximize readiness independent of 
cost, the authors present an alternative model based on economic utility that considers the 
cost of achieving readiness increases across all PEIs.   
 
E. INCONSISTENCY OF INPUTS 
As mentioned above, there are a number of inconsistencies inherent in the current 
application of the DERO model based requirements determination process.  Because the 
DERO operators either do not always have data for all DERO input variables or can not 
make the data they receive fit the DERO model input variables, several data input 
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variables to the DERO model are normally “zeroed out.”  This would lead one to assume 
that the same DERO run would have different outputs depending on which input 
variables had been zeroed out.  The idea of running the DERO model in twenty million 
dollar increments in an attempt to provide the stakeholders with a prioritized list of which 
PEIs to send to DLMP is simply not a correct application of the DERO model.  While the 
stakeholders indeed desire to see a prioritized list, it is impossible for the current DERO 
model to provide one.  Finally, because the DERO model is a POM support tool, it is run 
primarily during the POM development process during even numbered years.  This 
means that the DERO output from the POM years should not be changed between POM 
years.  However, as recent world events have proven, circumstances change vastly 
between POM years.  All of this suggests that the DERO model may not be the best 
alternative to use for DLMP execution 
 
F. DERO MODEL OUTPUT; ITS USE, FORMAT, AND FLEXIBILITY 
As stated above, the representatives from the Supply Chain Management Center 
manipulated the DERO model input in an effort to present the DERO model output in a 
manner they thought stakeholders expected to see; that is in a prioritized sequence from 
most important to least important in the context of DLMP selection.  It is impossible to 
present DERO model output in its present form in this manner since the DERO model 
simply optimizes readiness given a specific budget.  The DERO model does not present 
output in any sort of prioritized sequence because output prioritization is not part of the 
DERO optimization model.  For stakeholders, this format offers limited use and offers no 
flexibility.  Stakeholders desire to have a prioritized list of DLMP candidate PEIs that 
they can pick and choose from based on changing resource and/or operational 
environments.  In all other military contexts, operational (i.e. execution) planning is 
based on equally suitable yet differentiated courses of action that can be quickly selected 
based on dynamic situations.  By contrast, the DERO model offers only a “take it or leave 
it” solution.  If a resource manager wanted to change one input variable for one PEI in 
order  to  attempt  to  get  that  PEI included in the DERO model output, the entire DERO  
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model output may change.  The DERO model operators told the authors that there is no 
way to tell why a particular PEI was included in the DERO model output and why 
another one wasn’t.   
 
G. STAKEHOLDER DISSATISFACTION 
Essentially, stakeholders are dissatisfied with the current DERO model based 
requirements determination process largely because it is too complex, it offers 
stakeholders little opportunity to influence DERO output based on changing resource or 
operational environments, and the DERO model does not adequately support DLMP 
execution.  This widespread dissatisfaction with the current system has resulted in the 
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics chartering a Best Value Equipment 
Sustainment Working Group.  While the Best Value Equipment Sustainment Working 
Group is a topic separate from the scope of this project, it does recommend updating or 
replacing the current DERO model.  A large part of the Working Group intent is to allow 
the DLMP to more effectively represent warfighter requirements.  In the following 




















A. WARFIGHTING VALUES 
1. Introduction 
The original goal of this project was to design a better system to develop and 
assign Warfighting Values (WFVs).  That is, to find a more effective was to assign the 
variable that ultimately defines how important a piece of equipment is to the Marine 
Corps.  Many of the stakeholders are not satisfied with the WFVs used in the current 
process and really do not have a clear understanding of how they are generated or what 
impact they have.  Additionally, as a result of this study, it was discovered that the 
current WFV attribute does not significantly impact the current model.  In other words, 
the current method being used to determine WFVs is not only unpopular with the 
stakeholders, but it is also not doing what it was intended to do (this was also 
documented in the meeting minutes for a DLMP Working Group in 2003).   For this 
reason, it is imperative that WFVs be assigned in a manner that adds real value to the 
model.  
2. Choosing Attributes 
WFV is an attribute intended to capture the warfighting capability a Principal End 
Item (PEI) provides to the Marine Corps and the end user.  In other words, the greater the 
WFV is for a PEI, the greater the value is to the warfighter.  The current method used to 
develop WFVs, and the concerns associated with this process, was covered extensively in 
Chapter II.  In this section, the focus will be on a new, more beneficial approach to 
developing WFVs that should add significant value to the DLMP.   
Rather than assigning a WFV score from 1 to 4 to a PEI, it is more advantageous 
to define attributes that are important to the warfighter first.  Once these attributes are 
defined, PEIs can then be compared to one another based on these attributes.  Although 
there is still some subjectivity involved in choosing specific attributes, the overall result 
is a much more objective process.  The process described by the authors will also allow 
the users to assign a WFV based on much more diverse criteria than the current process 
of assigning a score from 1 to 4.  Although the authors have a combined total of 34 years 
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of experience working with PEIs as managers and as end users, the most logical approach 
to defining what makes a PEI important to the warfighter was through personal 
interviews with key stakeholders in the DLMP.  In July 2004, key players involved in the 
DLMP, to include the Maintenance Management Officers from each MEF, were 
interviewed at the DLMP conference in Albany, Georgia.  These interviews, along with 
further research into the current process, and the use of the brainstorming tool in 
Criterium DecisionPlus (which will be discussed in depth later in this chapter) led to the 
following attributes being defined as the most important in defining quality WFVs: 
MCGERR Reportable, Lifecycle Indicator, Source of Requirement, and Combat Weapon 
System.  These factors are described in more detail below. 
While every effort was made to be systematic, more rigorous methods exist for 
the collection and assessment of the qualitative data obtained through unstructured 
interviews with key players involved with DLMP (see e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).  
More rigorous procedures also exist to develop measures to validate the factorial 
structure developed by the authors (construct validity and factor analysis: see e.g., 
Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991).  The authors chose not to apply these methods in part 
because the focus in this study is on the development and application of a procedure to 
obtain WFVs given a set of factors: not on the development of authoritative, static and 
final set of factors to be applied to all PEIs.  
a. MCGERR Reportable 
MCGERR reportable equipment is identified in Marine Corps Bulletin 
3000, Table of Marine Corps Ground Equipment Resource Reporting (MCGERR) 
Equipment.  Equipment included in this bulletin must be a principal end item that is 85-
percent fielded Marine Corps wide (including the Reserves), nominated by either the 
field commands or Headquarters, Marine Corps, and accepted for inclusion by the DC, 
I&L.  These PEIs are mission essential equipment that that are required to be reported to 
higher headquarters.  The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) uses the equipment 
readiness reporting in MCGERR to measure each unit’s capability to perform its assigned 
mission.  Due to its significance to the end users and the Marine Corps as a whole, 
readiness for the PEIs identified as MCGERR Reportable is evaluated on a weekly basis.  
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Therefore, due to the importance placed upon this type of equipment, MCGERR 
Reportable has been identified as a key attribute in defining relevant WFVs. 
b. Lifecycle Indicator 
Lifecycle Indicator is an attribute that captures where a PEI is in its 
lifecycle.  In other words, it is an indication that a PEI is either in the early stage of its 
lifecycle (also know as infant mortality), in the middle stage of its lifecycle (also known 
as normal life period), or at the end of its lifecycle (wear-out period).  Figure 1 is a 
graphical representation of these lifecycle stages called the bathtub curve.  This curve 
consists of the infant mortality period, normal or “useful life” period (which has a low, 
relatively constant failure rate), and the wear-out period (which has an increasing failure 
rate).    Wear-out is inevitable due to fatigue or depletion of materials.  In other words, in 
the long run, everything wears out.   
  
 
Figure 1.   The Bathtub Curve 
 
 It is during this period, when reliability and operational availability are 
decreasing, that PEIs must be inducted into depot level maintenance.  Quantity of 
WIRs/AAO is the equation that will be used as a lifecycle indicator.  The greater the 
score for Quantity of WIRs/AAO, the more likely that a PEI is moving to the latter stages 
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in its lifecycle.  Simply stated, the higher the ratio of WIRs is to AAO, the more worn out 
the equipment is, and the more imperative depot level maintenance becomes to extend the 
equipment’s lifecycle.  It is important to note that combat WIRs may be an exception.  
Although a PEI with several combat-related  WIRs may still be in the early stages of its 
lifecycle, a high Quantity of WIRs/AAO score is still a good indicator that it is in need of 
depot level maintenance to maintain operational availability.   For this reason, Lifecycle 
Indicator has been chosen as a second WFV attribute.  
c. Source of Requirement 
Source of Requirement, also known as Waterfall Value, represents the unit 
that is requesting to induct equipment into depot level maintenance.  More specifically, a 
Source of Requirement value will be applied to each PEI based upon the unit requesting 
service.  Currently, waterfall value is a tool used for distributing PEIs as they come out of 
depot level maintenance.   This is based on the theory that some units have priority over 
others due to their missions and operational tempo (e.g., a unit that is currently in a 
combat zone or real world scenario has a much higher priority than a Base unit in the 
States).  Each unit is listed from most important to least important on a “waterfall” chart 
that is updated on an as needed basis.  This distribution tool is a strong indicator of what 
equipment is important to induct into depot level maintenance.  Therefore, due to the 
importance of the requesting unit, Source of Requirement was chosen as the most 
essential WFV attribute.  It is important to note that although most PEIs have multiple 
sources; values for this attribute will be based on the highest priority source. 
d. Combat Weapon Systems 
For the purpose of this project, Combat Weapon System is any PEI that is 
actually used in combat (i.e., it is a PEI that actually fires live rounds at the enemy).  
Obviously, this is considered to be an important attribute due to the necessity of these 
PEIs being operationally available.  Without these PEIs, missions cannot be 
accomplished.  Therefore, Combat Weapon System was chosen as the final WFV factor. 
It should be clear that, with the possible exception of Combat Weapon 
System, the factors that have been described by the authors are not static: MCGGER, 
Waterfall Values and lifecycle indicators may change from year to year for a given PEI.  
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Hence, a procedure is needed to systematically assign values to PEIs on each of these 
factors in an expedient manner, so that the procedure can be applied yearly.  The authors 
describe such a procedure in the next section. 
3. Criterium DecisionPlus 
a. Overview 
Once the desirable WFV attributes were selected, the next objective was to 
assign appropriate weights for each attribute in order to accurately reflect its importance 
to the warfighter.  Once the weights have been established, the attributes could then be 
assigned to a sample of PEIs in order to measure their effectiveness in defining realistic 
WFVs.  Rather than arbitrarily assigning numbers or weights to the attributes, the goal of 
this project was to be as objective as possible.  Since this process involved several 
different criteria against which various alternatives were compared, tracking and rating 
the importance of those criteria presented a major challenge.  Therefore, a decision 
management tool called Criterium DecisionPlus was chosen to assign value to the WFV 
attributes. 
According to the Criterium DecisionPlus User’s Guide, Criterium 
DecisionPlus implements the two primary decision-making methodologies currently 
being used by the government and commercial businesses alike; Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) and Multiattribute Utility Theory as implemented in the Simple 
Multiattribute Rating Technique (SMART).   The main difference between the two is the 
rating techniques they use.  SMART was the method of choice for this project.  This 
technique breaks the decision problem down into attributes, and single attribute 
evaluations are constructed by means of value measurements.  A value tree structure is 
created to assist in defining the problem, and values are determined for each attribute.  
Then, aggregation of the model results in facilitating comparison of the alternatives. 
As the User’s Guide states, the general approach most people use in 
decision making can be described as a process of logical activities.  The first step is to 
define the problem.  Not only must the goal be identified, the factors that are important or 
that can affect the decision must also be defined.  Once the problem has been defined, 
brainstorming is a tool that can be used to identify all the issues that should be considered 
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in the decision.  Figure 2 illustrates the decision process that Criterium DecisionPlus 
supports.  Criterium DecisionPlus’s brainstorming capability assists in defining the 
problem and identifying the issues.  In this step, the user starts with a clean canvas and 




Figure 2.   The Decision Process Diagram 
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The next step is to build the hierarchy, which can be generated by 
Criterium DecisionPlus automatically.  It should be clear to the reader that Criterium 
DecisionPlus uses the term hierarchy because it allows for subfactors.  The authors also 
refer to these subfactors as attributes or factors throughout the project.  Rating the 
hierarchy, (i.e., judging or weighting the importance of the criteria and scoring the 
alternatives) is next.  Weights can be entered and viewed in three ways; a numeric view, 
verbal view, or graphic view.     
Full pairwise comparisons can be made by rating criteria against one 
another within its rating set or by using an abbreviated pairwise comparison that rates 
only subsets of all such pairs.  The alternatives can then be rated against those criteria by 
assigning numeric, verbal, or graphic values.  Using the SMART methodology, a 
function can be defined to determine the effective value of such ratings.  
After the hierarchy has been rated, the results must be reviewed.  
Criterium DecisionPlus calculates in real time (i.e., it continually calculates results as the 
weights are entered so that if a value is changed, the results can be seen immediately).  In 
Criterium DecisionPlus, the results can be viewed as discrete values (decision scores), 
which represent the preferences of alternatives, or as a screen that shows the contribution 
to each alternative preference based on the criteria at a given level in the hierarchy 
(contributions screen).  This step also provides the opportunity to review the results from 
a common sense perspective.  The user needs to ensure that the results make sense on a 
basic level. 
The next step is to analyze the results.  Criterium DecisionPlus determines 
how sensitive the decision is to changes in the relative importance assigned to criteria.  It 
also prioritizes the list in order of most to least critical.  This allows the user to focus on 
the criteria that can influence the decision the most.   After the results have been analyzed 
using Criterium DecisionPlus, it should be evident that the preferred alternative, or final 
decision, is sound. 
Finally, the decision must be documented in a manner that all interested 
parties can understand how and why the ultimate decision was reached.  Not only will 
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documentation provide insight into the decision making process, it also enables users to 
revisit the process if future events dictate change.    
b. Methodology 
This section is devoted to describing how the authors used Criterium 
DecisionPlus to assign weights to WFV attributes, which ultimately produces a ranked 
list of PEIs in order of WFV. 
Since the overall goal was to assign weighted WFV attributes to each PEI, 
the first step was to set the goal in Criterium DecisionPlus’s brainstorming session to 
“Assign WFV”.  The important criteria were identified as the four aforementioned 
attributes that were determined to be essential elements in determining the importance of 
each piece of gear; MCGERR Reportable, Lifecycle Indicator, Source of Requirement, 
and Combat Weapon System.  A sample of 30 TAMCNs, or PEIs, was listed as the 
alternatives.  This list was generated in a manner that would provide a fair distribution 
that would adequately represent the total population of PEIs that were eligible for depot 
level maintenance (e.g.,  combat weapon systems and non combat weapon systems, 
MCGERR Reportable and non MCGERR Reportable, current WFVs from 1 to 4, PEIs 
belonging to different units, etc.).  A full list of the selected PEIs is listed in Table 1. 












A0966 Mobile EW Support System PIP 
A1260 Navigation Set, Satellite Signals PLGR 
A1440 Radar Set, Firefinder 
A1503 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range 
A2306 Sensor System Monitor, Mobile 
A2505 Switchboard, Telephone, Automatic 
A2635 Telephone Set 
B0589 Excavator, Combat 
B1291 Decontamination System, Ltwt 
B1139 Hose Reel System (HRS) 
B1580 Pump  Module, Fuel (SIXCON) 
B2086 Storage Tank Module, Water (SixCon) 
B2460 Tractor, Full Tr (T5) 
D0235 Semi-Trlr, Lowbed, 40T 
D0080 Chassis, Trlr, GP, 3 1/2T, 2 Whl 
D0877 Trlr, Powered, Wrecker/Recovery, 4X5 
D0879 Trlr, Powered, 30T, Cargo, Dropside 
D1092 Trk, Maint, Telephone 
D1160 Interim Fast Attack Vehicle 
E0150 Armored Vehicle, Launcher, Bridge 
E0277 Display Group, Data 
E0856 AAV, Recovery 
E0930 Launch Simulator, Stinger 
E0942 LAV, Anti-Tank 
E0947 LAV, Light Assault, 25mm 
E0960 Machine Gun, Lt, Squad, Auto Wpn 
E0989 Machine Gun, Medium, 7.62mm 
E1356 Recharging Unit, Coolant, Trng 
E1888 Tank, Combat, FT, 120mm Gun 
E3191 Trainer, Handling GM Launch (Stinger) 
 
Table 1. List of PEIs used for this project 
      
After the goal, important criteria, and alternatives were identified in the 
brainstorming session, the hierarchy could be generated.  An example of the hierarchy is 




Figure 3.   Example of the Hierarchy Produced by Criterium DecisionPlus 
 
Once the hierarchy was built, it needed to be rated.  The first step in this 
process was to choose the goal (Assign WFV Attributes) and rate the criteria (WFV 
Attributes) accordingly.  More specifically, a weight from 1 to 100 had to be assigned to 
each of the four attributes based on its importance relative to the goal.  Based on the 
interviews with key players in the DLMP and further research into the DLMP process, 
Source of Requirement was determined to be the most important attribute in assigning 
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meaningful WFVs.  As such, it received an overall weight of 100.  Lifecycle Indicator 
and Combat Weapon System were selected as the next most important WFV attributes 
and received a weight of 90 each.  Finally, the MCGERR Reportable attribute received a 
weight of 80.      
Once all the weights were established for the four major attributes 
(criteria), scores had to be assigned for each PEI (alternatives) to reflect how each was 
impacted by the criteria.  For the MCGERR Reportable attribute, a PEI either received a 
rating of 0 if it was not in the Marine Corps Bulletin 3000 or 100 if it was listed in the 
Bulletin.  Additionally, TAMCNs received a score ranging between 10 and 100 for the 
Lifecycle Indicator attribute.  Once the Quantity of WIRs/AAO calculation was complete 
for each PEI, this value was rated by percentage, then grouped and given a score 
depending on which group the TAMCN fell into.  Table 2 illustrates these groups by 
percentages.  
 
  Lifecycle Indicator Scores   
       
  Value Score    
  .1 or > 100    
  .08 - .09 90    
  .06 - .07 80    
  .04 - .05 70    
  .02 - .03 60    
  .009 - .01 50    
  .007-.008 40    
  .005 - .006 30    
  .003 - .004 20    
  .001 - .002 10    
  0 0    
       
* Note:  Numbers will be rounded up and given the appropriate score. 
For example, if the value is .075, that TAMCN will receive a score of 90. 
 
Table 2. Lifecycle Indicator Scores Based on WIR/AAO Calculations 
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Using the most current waterfall chart, Source of Requirement was also 
broken down into ratings ranging between 10 and 100.  For example, a TAMCN that was 
needed by the operating forces, (e.g., II MEF) would be weighed more heavily than a 
TAMCN that was requested by the equipment stores in Norway.  Table 3 illustrates the 
weights that were assigned to each unit for Source of Requirement. 
 
          Weights Assigned for Waterfall Value 
     
 Unit  Weight  
     
 I MEF/Special Mission  100  
 MPS  90  
 II & III MEF  80  
 29 Palms EEAP  70  
 Res T/A  60  
 Reserve Stores  50  
 DMFA  40  
 Norway  30  
 Gen. Supt. (Bases, etc.)  20  
 Net WRMR  10  
 
Table 3. Weights Assigned for Waterfall Value (Source of Requirement) by Unit 
 
Finally, the Combat Weapon System attribute was scored in a manner 
similar to the MCGERR Reportable attribute.  If a PEI was a weapon that fired live 
rounds in actual combat, it received a rating of 100.  If a PEI was not used in actual 
combat, it received a rating of 0.   
To summarize the hierarchy rating process, each PEI was rated once by 
each of the four attributes (which were rated between 80 and 100 in the first step).  For 
example, the TAMCN A1260 received a rating of 0 for MCGERR Reportable (because it 
was not in the Marine Corps Bulletin 3000), a rating of 60 for Lifecycle Indicator 
(because it received a score of .0227), a rating of 0 for Combat Weapon System (because 
it is not involved in direct combat), and a rating of 100 for Source of Requirement 
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(because it was requested by I MEF).  Each TAMCN was rated in a similar manner in 
order to obtain the final results.  The scores for each PEI that were used as input into 















A0966 Mobile EW Support System PIP 100 80 80 0
A1260 Navigation Set, Satellite Signals PLGR 0 60 100 0
A1440 Radar Set, Firefinder 100 100 80 0
A1503 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range 100 0 80 0
A2306 Sensor System Monitor, Mobile 100 90 80 0
A2505 Switchboard, Telephone, Automatic 100 40 80 0
A2635 Telephone Set 0 50 80 0
B0589 Excavator, Combat 100 40 80 0
B1291 Decontamination System, Ltwt 100 10 80 0
B1139 Hose Reel System (HRS) 0 0 80 0
B1580 Pump  Module, Fuel (SIXCON) 100 60 80 0
B2086 Storage Tank Module, Water (SixCon) 0 90 80 0
B2460 Tractor, Full Tr (T5) 100 50 80 0
D0235 Semi-Trlr, Lowbed, 40T 100 20 40 0
D0080 Chassis, Trlr, GP, 3 1/2T, 2 Whl 0 40 10 0
D0877 Trlr, Powered, Wrecker/Recovery, 4X5 100 50 80 0
D0879 Trlr, Powered, 30T, Cargo, Dropside 100 10 80 0
D1092 Trk, Maint, Telephone 0 0 80 0
D1160 Interim Fast Attack Vehicle 100 50 80 0
E0150 Armored Vehicle, Launcher, Bridge 100 0 80 0
E0277 Display Group, Data 100 0 10 0
E0856 AAV, Recovery 100 0 80 0
E0930 Launch Simulator, Stinger 0 0 40 0
E0942 LAV, Anti-Tank 100 100 80 100
E0947 LAV, Light Assault, 25mm 100 70 80 100
E0960 Machine Gun, Lt, Squad, Auto Wpn 0 60 100 100
E0989 Machine Gun, Medium, 7.62mm 100 60 80 100
E1356 Recharging Unit, Coolant, Trng 0 0 50 0
E1888 Tank, Combat, FT, 120mm Gun 100 80 90 100
E3191 Trainer, Handling GM Launch (Stinger) 0 0 60 0
 







After all the alternatives (PEIs) received all four ratings, Criterium 
DecisionPlus generated the final scores.  If the criteria have been weighted accurately and 
the alternatives have been rated in a logical manner, the PEIs receiving the highest scores 
should be those that belong to units within I MEF or units performing special missions, 
are MCGERR Reportable, have a high ratio of WIRs, and are directly involved in actual 
combat.  In the scores and reports section, the five PEIs receiving the highest scores and 
the five PEIs receiving the lowest scores will be discussed in depth. 
(1) Scores and Reports.  The full list of scores ranked from highest 




Figure 4.   The Decision Score Report Produced in Criterium DecisionPlus 
 
 33
The PEI receiving the highest score was TAMCN E0942, LAV, 
Anti-Tank.  This PEI is used in direct combat, is MCGERR Reportable, had a very high 
number of WIRs compared to AAO, and was nominated for induction by I MEF.  
Therefore, it received the highest possible score for each attribute, which gave it a final 
score of 1.000 (on a scale from 0 to 1).  The second highest score, with a value of .925, 
belonged to E0947, LAV, Light Assault, 25mm.  Obviously, this PEI is involved in direct 
combat as well, so it received a score of 100 for Combat Weapon System.  It also 
received perfect scores for MCGERR Reportable and Source of Requirement (it belonged 
to I MEF).  The main difference between the first and second PEI was the Lifecycle 
Indicator attribute (E0947 received a 70).  E1888, Tank, Combat, 120mm Gun, was the 
third highest scoring PEI with a value of .922.  In addition to receiving the maximum 
rating for the Combat Weapon System attribute, it received a 100 for MCGERR 
Reportable, a 90 for Source of Requirement (it belonged to MPS), and an 80 for 
Lifecycle Indicator.  The PEI with the fourth highest score of .900 was E0989, Machine 
Gun, Medium, 7.62mm.  Although this PEI received the highest possible ratings for the 
MCGERR Reportable, Source of Requirement, and Combat Weapon System attributes, it 
only received a 60 for Lifecycle Indicator.  Rounding out the top five, was A1440, Radar 
Set, Firefinder.  Although this PEI is not a system that fires live rounds in combat (it 
received a Combat Weapon System rating of 0), it received the highest possible values 
for the remaining three attributes.  A value of 100 for Source of Requirement, which is 
the most heavily weighted attribute, is a key reason this PEI is in the top five.  
The situation is much different for the five lowest scoring PEIs.  
The PEI that ranked fifth from the bottom was E0277, Display Group, Data, with an 
overall value of .250.  This PEI received a 100 for the MCGERR Reportable attribute, but 
only received a 10 for Source of Requirement (which indicates that for this specific 
DLMP cycle, it is being inducted by a unit that is very low on the waterfall chart).  
Furthermore, E0277 received a score of 0 for both the Lifecycle Indicator and Combat 
Weapon System attributes.  E3191, Trainer, Handling GM Launch (Stinger) was ranked 
fourth from last with a score of .167.  It received a 60 for the Source of Requirement 
attribute, but rated a score of 0 for the MCGERR Reportable, Lifecycle Indicator, and 
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Combat Weapon System attributes.  Ranked third from last was E1356, Recharging Unit, 
Coolant, Training, with a total value of .139.  This PEI received a 50 for Source of 
Requirement and a score of 0 for each of the remaining three attributes.  With an overall 
value of .126, D0080, Chassis, Trailer, GP, 3&1/2T, 2 Whl, was the second from last 
PEI.  It did receive a 40 for Lifecycle Indicator, but only scored a 10 for the Source of 
Requirement Attribute.  Once again, this PEI received a 0 for the remaining attributes.  
Finally, E0930, Launch Simulator, Stinger, was ranked as the last PEI with a total value 
of .111.  It received a score of 40 for Source of Requirement, but rated a 0 for the 
MCGERR Reportable, Lifecycle Indicator, and Combat Weapon System attributes. 
(2) Analysis.  At first glance, the results definitely pass the sanity 
check (or common sense) test.  The most heavily weighted attribute, Source of 
Requirement, obviously impacted the scores as expected.  The PEIs also seem to be 
ranked in a logical manner.  Criterium DecisionPlus is equipped with tools that enable 
users to analyze results on an even deeper level.  The Contribution by Criteria report is 
one such tool.  It is expected that the criteria with the highest accumulated weight to 
contribute more toward the results than the others.  However, if all the alternatives score 
low on those criteria, those criteria’s contribution to the overall decision score of the 
alternatives may be less than expected.  Through Criterium DecisionPlus’s contribution 
by criteria analysis, the criteria that actually made the largest contribution and the least 
contribution can be easily seen.  The result is a good indication whether the decision is a 
reasonable one or not, and if the weights are sensible or not. 
Figure 5 illustrate the contribution by criteria for each of the top 
five PEIs.  The pie charts illustrate the accumulated values of the five alternatives at a 
target criterion (the goal), broken down by the contribution from each of the criterion.   
 
 







Figure 5.   Contributions for Criteria for the Top Five PEIs 
 
These figures illustrate that the Source of Requirement attribute 
did indeed make the largest contribution to the decision.  Furthermore, it is evident the 
Lifecycle Indicator and Combat Weapon System attributes made the next most 
significant contribution.  For example, although E0989 and A1440 scored higher than 
E1888 for Source of Requirement, E1888’s higher scores for Combat Weapon System 
and Lifecycle Indicator pushed it ahead into the third position.   
Figure 6 illustrates the same information for each criterion for the 
last five PEIs.  Obviously, the contribution by criteria graph looks much different for the 




Figure 6.   Contributions by Criteria for the Bottom Five PEIs 
 
Again it is evident that although Source of Requirement has the 
most significant impact, if a PEI does not have an exceptionally high value for this 
attribute and scores low in the other attributes as well, it will finish more toward the 
bottom of the list.  These charts illustrate the way one factor/attribute can compensate for 
another, which explains the sensitivity of the solution to the weights given to these 
factors/attributes.   
Another tool offered by Criterium DecisionPlus is its Sensitivity 
Analysis feature.  Through Sensitivity Analysis, the user can determine how sensitive the 
decision is to changes in the relative importance to the criteria.  When Sensitivity 
Analysis is initiated, Criterium DecisionPlus shows a list of weights of sub criteria, with 
respect to their parent criteria, with a metric that measures the sensitivity of the result 
when the value of that weight is changed.  Criterium DecisionPlus prioritizes the list from 
most critical to least critical so the user can focus on the criteria that can influence the 
decision the most.  When weights are assigned to sub criterion with respect to a parent 
criterion, the decision model has the capability to discriminate between the alternatives.  
If the ordering of the leading alternatives changes with the smallest change in a particular 
weight, the decision model can be described as “sensitive” to that weight.  It is important 
to understand if the model is overly sensitive to such weights, and Criterium 
DecisionPlus enables the user to test just how sensitive the results are to changes in 
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weights.  In Figures 7 and 8, the sensitivity plots can be seen for the Lifecycle Indicator 










Figure 8.   Sensitivity by Combat Weapon System 
 
In the Sensitivity Plot figures, each weight is identified by the sub 
criterion whose weight it is (i.e., Lifecycle Indicator and Combat Weapon System), and 
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the parent criterion (i.e., Assign WFV) with respect to which its value is assigned.  The 
horizontal axis illustrates the priority of that weight (from 0 to 1) the model uses in 
calculating decision scores.  The vertical axis shows the decision score for each 
alternative.  The plot shows how changing the priority value of the current weight would 
affect the decision scores if it is varied over all possible values when all the other weights 
remain fixed.  The decision scores change linearly and each alternative is represented by 
a color-coded straight line.  The vertical red line is at the current value.  In other words, it 
illustrates the priority corresponding to the value of the weight that was entered in the 
criterion rating window.  The value of this weight is shown in verbal format in the 
parenthesis to the right of the graph.  The height of the intersection of the vertical red line 
and the alternatives’ lines provides the decision score that is current for each alternative.  
The plot shows only lines for five of these alternatives.  
A useful way to understand the significance of the sensitivity 
analysis is to measure how much the current value of the priority can change before the 
model’s preferred alternative (E0942) is superseded by a different alternative.  At this 
value, the lines corresponding to the top alternative and the second alternative intersect 
on the sensitivity plot.  This is called a crossover point, and there may be several or none 
in the plot for a given weight.  Measuring the change in priority values from the current 
value to the closest crossover point provides a useful measure of how important that 
weight is to the outcome of the model.  The plots in the figures above are for the weights 
with the most critical priority in the model.  If the model is stable (meaning the current 
preference will not change with small changes in the value of that priority) with respect 
to the most critical priority, then the model is said to be stable to changes in all other 
priorities in the model.  In simpler terms, when the percentage crossover number is 
greater than 5%, the current preference is stable to changes in every other priority 
throughout the entire model.  The lowest percentage crossover number in this decision 
model was 25%.  Therefore, E0942 is stable to changes in all other priorities.   
In Figure 7, which represents the sensitivity by Lifecycle Indicator, 
the vertical red line (i.e., the current value) is very close to the nearest crossover point.  
This indicates that a relatively small change in priority for Lifecycle Indicator will affect 
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the alternatives.  For example, by moving the line slightly to the left (decreasing its 
priority value) will cause E0947 to switch places (crossover) with E1888.  Moving the 
red line further to the left will result in another crossover between E1888 and E0989.  
Simply stated, if the weight for Lifecycle Indicator was reduced for these PEIs, they 
would be ranked differently in the final results.  In comparison, Figure 8, the sensitivity 
plot for the Combat Weapon System factor, is much different.  The red line could be 
moved far to the right without hitting any crossover points.  This indicates that these PEIs 
are much less sensitive to a change in the priority value for the Combat Weapon System 
attribute.   
4. Conclusion  
The authors chose this methodology in an effort to design a better system to 
develop and assign WFV attributes.  Using experience, interviews with key stakeholders, 
and the brainstorming tool in Criterium DecisionPlus, four attributes were chosen that 
were considered to be the most important in defining quality WFVs: MCGERR 
Reportable, Lifecycle Indicator, Source of Requirement, and Combat Weapon System.   
MCGERR Reportable equipment is identified in the Marine Corps Bulletin 3000 as being 
important enough to the Marine Corps that its readiness must be reported on a weekly 
basis.  The Lifecycle Indicator attribute captures where a PEI is in its lifecycle 
(beginning, middle, or end), and is determined by dividing the quantity of WIRs for a PEI 
by its AAO.  Source of Requirement is also known as the Waterfall Value.  This attribute 
represents the unit that is requesting to induct equipment into depot level maintenance, 
and was chosen as the most essential WFV attribute.  Finally, the Combat Weapon 
System attribute was assigned to any PEI that is used in direct combat.  Using Criterium 
decision plus, these four attributes were weighted, and then used to score the Alternatives 
(PEIs).  The final results were reviewed, analyzed and documented using this decision 
management tool.  
Criterium DecisionPlus proved to be a very valuable tool in generating the final 
list of WFVs.  In addition to being instrumental in defining and identifying the WFV 
attributes, Criterium DecisionPlus provided additional benefits.  It provided much deeper 
insight into all the factors that affected the final results.  It also instilled confidence that  
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all factors were considered within the decision framework.  In short, it took a process that 
can be described as very time consuming and subjective, and turned it into a more 
efficient and objective process.    
It is imperative to remember that Criterium DecisionPlus can be applied in many 
different scenarios and is relatively user friendly.  Changes can be made instantaneously, 
and because Criterium DecisionPlus continually calculates results as weights are entered, 
if the user changes a value, the results can be seen immediately.  For example, if the 
environment changes drastically in a year, different WFV attributes may be identified.  
Moreover, weights may be assigned much differently to the criteria.  Criterium 
DecisionPlus makes it very easy to address these changes and produce meaningful results 
in a timely manner.  Therefore, the PEI that is currently at the bottom of the list could be 
one of the top five PEIs a year later.  
Presently, the final results can actually be used in a couple of different ways.  
First of all, the final list can be used to assign readiness targets for each of the PEIs.  For 
example, the first PEI in the final list (E0942) would receive a much higher readiness 
target than the last PEI on the list (E0930).  Target Readiness will be discussed in greater 
detail in section C of this chapter.  Second, if necessary, the final results could be used as 
a stand alone product.  In other words, if time is a major constraint, Criterium 
DecisionPlus could be used to quickly generate a ranked list of PEIs that could be 
screened for submittal into depot maintenance.  Regardless of how Criterium 
DecisionPlus is implemented, it is a tool that provides many advantages to the end user 
and the Marine Corps as a whole.  For the purpose of this project, it provided a more 
advantageous approach to developing WFV attributes that will hopefully add significant 
value to the DLMP.  
 
B. UTILITY 
Utility is defined as the satisfaction or benefit that is received from consuming a 
good or service (Lieberman and Hall, 2000 p84).  In the context of the DLMP, there are 
two types of relevant utility; economic utility and warfighter utility 
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1. Economic Utility 
Economic utility is a measure of the return that the Marine Corps is getting for the 
investment that it is making in the Depot Maintenance process.  Specifically, economic 
utility is a measure of the increase in the readiness of assets that the Marine Corps 
achieves from the DLMP given the money that is allocated.  Economic utility is captured 
in the following term: ∆R/URC, the change in readiness received by repairing a quantity 
of (1) of a given PEI divided by the unit repair cost of that PEI.  As it applies to a specific 
PEI, the result of this term is the percentage increase in readiness received per dollar 
spent repairing that PEI.  Simply put, this term shows the “bang for the buck”.   
To illustrate this aspect, PEIs with varying densities and unit repair costs can be 
compared with respect to economic utility.  The following table contains 4 PEIs.  A1503 
has a low density and high URC, D1092 has a low density and moderate URC, A1260 
has a high density and low URC, and E0947 has a moderate density and a high URC.   
 
TAMCN NOMENCLATURE  URC  AAO ∆R ∆R/URC 
      
A1503 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range  $ 7,429,900.00 13 0.07692 0.001035
D1092 Trk, Maint, Telephone  $    143,000.00 22 0.04545 0.031786
A1260 
Navigation Set, Satellite 
Signals PLGR  $          348.00  5015 0.00020 0.057299
E0947 LAV, Light Assault, 25mm  $    405,326.00 379 0.00264 0.000651
 
Table 5. Economic Utility 
 
In this table the “∆R” column is the change in readiness that is realized by 
repairing one unit of that PEI.  The “∆R/URC” column is the change in readiness realized 
from repairing one unit of a PEI divided by the cost of doing so.  The results of this 
column have been multiplied by a factor of 100,000 for ease of comparing the numbers.  
It should be noted that the actual numbers in this column (.001…, .031…, etc) are not 
meaningful numbers.  This is true because we cannot spend just one dollar on repairing 
these items.  In order to repair a PEI at the depot we must incur the entire unit repair cost.  
The use of these numbers is a method of comparing the relative value (utility) of 
repairing a PEI given its density and cost.    
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The PEI with the highest economic utility of these four is the PLGR, A1260.  This 
says that the Marine Corps receives the most economic value for its money by spending 
dollars to repair PLGRs (keep in mind that economic utility is only one piece of the 
equation, warfighter utility will have a significant effect on the final prioritization of 
PEIs).   The PLGR is a very high density item with an AAO of 5015.  This high density 
makes the change in readiness associated with repairing one PLGR very low (.0002).  
However, the unit repair cost of the PLGR is extremely low (at $348 it is one of the 
lowest unit repair costs across all PEI’s).  This low URC offsets the low change in 
readiness per unit to the point where it is actually very economical to repair PLGRs.  The 
Marine Corps can repair a large number of PLGRs (eventually reaching a significant 
increase in readiness of PLGRs) for a small cost when compared to other assets.  The 3D 
Long Range Radar Set (Radar) is a very low density item with an AAO of 13.  This low 
density makes the change in readiness associated with repairing one Radar very high 
(.0769).  The unit repair cost of this radar (nearly $7.5 million) is one of the highest 
URCs across all PEIs.  This high URC is combined with the high change in readiness to 
create an economic utility that is relatively low when compared to other PEIs.   
2. Warfighter Utility 
Warfighter utility is an attempt to capture the value that a given PEI has to the 
warfighter relative to all other PEIs.  The methods used to derive a warfighting value 
have been described in detail in Chapter III-A.   
Unlike a commercial, profit maximizing organization, the Marine Corps must 
consider factors other than economic utility.  Utilizing the principals of economic utility 
alone would result in the least expensive, lowest density items being repaired first, while 
expensive and high density items would not compete well for limited Depot funds.  As 
would be expected, many of these very expensive, moderate density items are essential to 
mission accomplishment on the battlefield.  It is this competition for limited funds that 
requires trade offs to ensure that the Marine Corps is using best business practices to 
spend its depot maintenance dollars while operating in the best interest of the warfighter.  
It is for this reason that consistent, measured tradeoffs must be made between economic 
utility (∆R/URC), and warfighter utility.  
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C. TARGET READINESS 
Target readiness is the readiness rating that the DERO model attempts to achieve 
for each PEI.  In a situation with unlimited resources, DERO would strive to achieve a 
target readiness of 100% for all assets.  However, given fiscal constraints, it is understood 
that not all assets (in most cases no assets) will be restored to 100% readiness by the 
DLMP.  The DERO model does allow input for target readiness for each PEI.  Under the 
current practice, and as a matter of policy, target readiness has been designated as 85% 
for all PEIs.  However utilizing a common target readiness for all PEIs misses an 
opportunity for the DERO model to adequately discriminate between PEIs based on the 
principals of diminishing marginal returns and utility.   
1. Diminishing Marginal Returns 
Diminishing marginal returns is described as the decrease in satisfaction received 
from the nth unit of something, relative to the satisfaction received from the (nth-1) unit 
of the same.  In a military context, consider the following example.  Consider a tank 
commander who has 100 tanks in his command and is currently at a readiness rate of 
65%.  In order to be mission capable, this commander must have a readiness rate of 80%.  
However, though he is not technically mission capable until 80%, he is capable of 
performing limited missions at 75% readiness.  In this example, the utility received by the 
commander from repairing the first 10 tanks is very high (moving him from 65% to 75%, 
illustrated in red on the graph below).  The utility received from repairing the next 5 
tanks (75% to 80%, shown in green) is still high, but not as high as the first 10.  
Furthermore, the utility received from repairing additional tanks above 80% (shown in 





Figure 9.   Diminishing Marginal Utility Example 
 
To better illustrate this principal, consider a situation with limited resources where 
a task force commander has two assets (tanks and LAVs), both at a current readiness of 
50%.  This particular commander places a higher value on tanks than he does LAVs, and 
therefore begins to repair tanks with his limited resources.  As the repairs commence, the 
commander is happy to see his readiness of tanks increase while LAVs remain at 50%.  
Being a task force commander, the commander has a need to utilize both tanks and 
LAVs.  At some point in the repair process this commander will reach a point where 
repairing one LAV (bringing LAV readiness to 51%) provides him with a greater 
marginal utility than repairing one more tank (bringing him perhaps to 81% readiness).  
In other words, fixing the 31st tank is less important to the commander than fixing the 1st 
LAV.   
This demonstrates that the marginal utility received by fixing tanks (and 
presumably any PEI) diminishes as readiness grows higher and higher.  At some point, it 
becomes more important to leave tanks where they are and fix a PEI that is at a lower 
readiness rate.  This principal says that in general, given limited resources, it is better to 
repair a PEI with a lower readiness rating before repairing another PEI with a higher 
readiness rating.  However, as illustrated in the last example (tanks and LAVs), some 
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PEIs are more valuable to the warfighter than others.  It is this discrepancy in value that 
leads the authors to recommend tying warfighting values to target readiness.   
2. Target Readiness as a Measure of Warfighter Utility 
The current practice of setting the target readiness of every PEI to 85% does not 
reflect the discrepancy in value to the warfighter across the spectrum of PEIs.  Under this 
system, a tank with a current readiness of 70% will receive the same treatment by the 
model as a PLGR (all other things being equal).  However, assume that the target 
readiness of the tank was 95%, and the target readiness of the PLGR was 80%.  And now 
suppose that the diminishing marginal returns experienced by the warfighter were 
reflected in the model by the distance (or difference) from the target readiness to the 
current readiness.  In this situation, the tank has a difference of 25% (95%-70%), while 
the PLGR has a difference of 10% (80%-70%).  Based on the principal of diminishing 
marginal returns, it is clear that under these circumstances the model should give 
preference to repairing the tank over the PLGR (all other things being equal).  The 
application of the readiness differential will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.   
How does one assign a target readiness to a PEI?  The authors recommendation is 
to convert the warfighting values discussed in Chapter III-A to a target readiness for each 
PEI.  This process is both subjective and objective; however, if applied uniformly across 
all PEIs the subjectivity with respect to any given PEI will be negligible.  Additionally, 
just as the warfighting values are dynamic and will change from year to year for a given 
PEI to reflect current priorities and an ever changing global threat, so will target 
readiness.  The intent of this system is to assign PEIs with the highest warfighting values 
a correspondingly high target readiness.  PEIs with a high target readiness will receive 
preferential treatment over PEIs with a lower target readiness (all other things being 
equal). 
As detailed in Chapter III-A WFVs are represented by a ranking value that is 
derived from the weighting of four attributes.  The result is a ranking value between 0 





Figure 10.   Scatter Plot of WFVs From the Sample Population 
 
The intent in this case is to group PEIs with similar WFVs together and assign 
them a target readiness.  There are a number of academic references that discuss detailed 
methods of cluster analysis.  One such method utilizes a clustering algorithm to partition 
similar observances together.  This method utilizes dissimilarities, which are non-
negative numbers that are close to zero when two points are near each other, and are large 
when two points are very different (Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990 p16).  Under this 
methodology, the dissimilarities between points within a cluster are minimized while the 
distance between clusters is maximized (Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990, p40).  The 
result of this process is partitioned clusters containing the points with the most similar 
characteristics.  Given these like clusters of WFVs, one can assign a target readiness to 
each cluster.   
Another method of transferring these WFVs to target readiness is to use a linear 
model.  Doing so requires a decision of an upper and lower limit for the range of target 
readiness.  The ranges of target readiness are a policy decision that must consider 
acceptable levels of readiness, specifically on the low end.  The details of this decision 
are outside the scope of this project.  The authors have chosen a range of 100%-75% for  
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the purpose of illustrating the method.  This methodology creates a 4:1 ratio between 
WFV and target readiness.  The chart below shows this ratio across the range of WFVs 
and target readiness.   
WFV 
Target 
Readiness   WFV 
Target 
Readiness
         
1.00-.98 100%  .50-.46 87% 
.98-.94 99%  .46-.42 86% 
.94-.90 98%  .42-.38 85% 
.90-.86 97%  .38-.34 84% 
.86-.82 96%  .34-.30 83% 
.82-.78 95%  .30-.26 82% 
.78-.74 94%  .26-.22 81% 
.74-.70 93%  .22-.18 80% 
.70-.66 92%  .18-.14 79% 
.66-.62 91%  .14-.10 78% 
.62-.58 90%  .10-.06 77% 
.58-.54 89%  .06-02 76% 
.54-.50 88%   .02-.00 75% 
 
Table 6. Linear Conversion of WFVs to Target Readiness 
 
The PEIs with the highest value to the warfighter have the highest target 
readiness, and therefore receive a higher priority for depot repairs (again, all other things 
being equal).  In effect, the warfighting value is now present in the form of target 
readiness.   
The WFV and corresponding target readiness of the 30 sample PEIs used in this 








TAMCN Nomenclature WFV 
Target 
Readiness 
A0966 Mobile EW Support System PIP 0.7 93% 
A1260 Navigation Set, Satellite Signals PLGR 0.428 86% 
A1440 Radar Set, Firefinder 0.75 94% 
A1503 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range 0.5 88% 
A2306 Sensor System Monitor, Mobile 0.725 93% 
A2505 Switchboard, Telephone, Automatic 0.6 90% 
A2635 Telephone Set 0.403 85% 
B0589 Excavator, Combat 0.6 90% 
B1291 Decontamination System, Ltwt 0.525 88% 
B1139 Hose Reel System (HRS) 0.278 82% 
B1580 Pump  Module, Fuel (SIXCON) 0.65 91% 
B2086 Storage Tank Module, Water (SixCon) 0.503 88% 
B2460 Tractor, Full Tr (T5) 0.625 91% 
D0235 Semi-Trlr, Lowbed, 40T 0.383 85% 
D0080 Chassis, Trlr, GP, 3 1/2T, 2 Whl 0.128 78% 
D0877 Trlr, Powered, Wrecker/Recovery, 4X5 0.625 91% 
D0879 Trlr, Powered, 30T, Cargo, Dropside 0.525 88% 
D1092 Trk, Maint, Telephone 0.278 82% 
D1160 Interim Fast Attack Vehicle 0.625 91% 
E0150 Armored Vehicle, Launcher, Bridge 0.5 88% 
E0277 Display Group, Data 0.25 81% 
E0856 AAV, Recovery 0.5 88% 
E0930 Launch Simulator, Stinger 0.111 78% 
E0942 LAV, Anti-Tank 1 100% 
E0947 LAV, Light Assault, 25mm 0.925 98% 
E0960 Machine Gun, Lt, Squad, Auto Wpn 0.678 92% 
E0989 Machine Gun, Medium, 7.62mm 0.9 98% 
E1356 Recharging Unit, Coolant, Trng 0.139 78% 
E1888 Tank, Combat, FT, 120mm Gun 0.922 98% 
E3191 Trainer, Handling GM Launch (Stinger) 0.167 79% 
 
Table 7. Target Readiness Conversion for the Sample Set 
 
3. Piece-Wise Linear Coefficient 
The current DERO model captures the principal of diminishing marginal returns 
as shown in the following graph. 
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Figure 11.   Diminishing Returns DERO Model 
 
The diminishing marginal returns are captured in a piece-wise linear function.  
The key aspect of this function is the slopes of each of the line segments.  The slopes of 
these segments (14, 7, 3, 2, 5 –as utilized in the DERO model) result in a greater increase 
in utility for PEIs with a lower readiness (and therefore larger slope) for each unit 
increase in readiness, compared to PEIs with a higher readiness (and smaller slope).  At 
point A on the graph, a 3% increase in readiness (the horizontal change at point A) results 
in an increase in utility equal to the vertical change shown at point A.  At point B, the 
same 3% increase in readiness results in an increase of utility equal to the vertical change 
shown at point B.  The same change in readiness results in a much greater increase in 
utility at point A than at point B.   
While maintaining the same principals of this piece-wise function, the authors 
have modified the way in which it is applied to utilize the target readiness less current 
readiness procedure described previously.  Specifically, the X axis has been changed 





Figure 12.   Diminishing Returns Utilizing the Readiness Differential 
 
A PEI’s target readiness less its current readiness equals the readiness differential 
for that PEI, and determines where that PEI falls out on the piece-wise linear curve.  The 
target readiness has been determined by capturing the warfighters utility of that PEI.    
Using this methodology, a PEI with a readiness differential on the left portion of the 
graph will receive preferential treatment over a PEI with a readiness differential on the 
right portion of the graph.   
The coefficient for a given PEI is determined by the slope of the piece-wise linear 
curve which contains the readiness differential for that PEI.  For example, a PEI with a 
target readiness of 90% and a current readiness of 68% has a readiness differential of 
22%.  This PEI falls on the portion of the graph where the slope of the line is 14, 
therefore the coefficient of this PEI is 14.  Another PEI that has a target readiness of 90% 
and a current readiness of 83% has a readiness differential of 7%.  This PEI falls on the 
portion of the graph where the slope of the line is 3, therefore the coefficient of this PEI 
is 3.   
At the point where the readiness differential becomes negative the coefficient is 
0.5.  At this point a PEI enters into the DLMP with a current readiness that is greater than 
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its target readiness.  In this situation it is more beneficial to the warfighter for the process 
to repair PEIs with a positive readiness differential than those with a negative differential.    
The coefficient of 0.5 will act to penalize a PEI with a negative readiness differential.  
This concept will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV.   
The coefficient (as a representation of WFV via target readiness) portrays 
warfighter utility.  The term (∆R/URC) portrays economic utility.  The interaction 
between economic and warfighter utility is the basis for the model that is recommended 
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IV. UTILITY ALGORITHM 
A. ALGORITHM 
Utilizing the methodologies of warfighting values, utility and target readiness 
discussed in Chapter III, the following algorithm is presented as an alternative to the 
DERO model.   
(∆R/URC)*Cn = Ranking Value 
 
As previously discussed, the ∆R/URC portion of this equation accounts for 
economic utility.  The coefficient variable (Cn) represents the slope of the piece-wise 
linear curve which contains the readiness differential (target readiness less current 
readiness).  Each PEI’s target readiness is directly correlated to the WFV of that PEI.  
Therefore, the warfighter’s utility is represented in this model by the coefficient.  The 
result of the algorithm when applied across all PEIs is a prioritized list of PEIs to be 
funded for depot maintenance in order to account for economic and warfighter utility.   
A portion of the output is provided below to illustrate the inputs of the utility 
algorithm.   
TAMCN NOMENCLATURE  URC  AAO USR Tgt R Curr R ∆R ∆R/URC R Diff Cn 
                      
E0150 
Armored Vehicle, 
Launcher, Bridge  232,515  27 1  .88 0.5900 0.0370 0.0159  .29 14 
A0966 
Mobile EW Support 
System   307,613  13 1  .93 0.7692 0.0769 0.0250  .161 7 
D1160 
Interim Fast Attack 
Vehicle     50,000 80 9  .91 0.5700 0.0125 0.0250  .34 14 
 
Table 8. Utility Algorithm Inputs 
 
The URC is the cost of repairing a single unit of a PEI at the depot.  The ∆R is the 
increase in readiness for a PEI when a single unit is repaired (∆R is 1/AAO).  ∆R/URC is 
the increase in readiness per dollar spent, or the economic utility of repairing a PEI.  This 
utility is a fixed characteristic of a PEI and will not change as the model is executed (the 
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only change to this value would occur if either the unit repair cost itself changes, or if the 
AAO changes.  These changes are considered to be external to this process, and their 
effect on the model will not be discussed).  USR is the quantity of unserviceable returns 
that are available for turn in to the depot.  Tgt R is the readiness rate that is desired for a 
given PEI, given a constrained budget, and is derived from the PEI’s WFV.  Curr R is the 
current readiness of each PEI.  R Diff is the readiness differential, or target readiness less 
current readiness.   Cn is the coefficient of the PEI.   
 
B. MODEL DRIVERS 
There are four primary elements that drive the outcome of this model; the 
combination of density and cost, WFVs in the form of a target readiness, current 
readiness, and unserviceable returns.   
It has been demonstrated that the ratio of density and cost (∆R/URC) provide a 
measure of the “bang for the buck” or economic utility.  In general, a low density and low 
URC will create the highest economic utility and therefore have a positive effect on the 
final ranking value.  Conversely, a high density and high URC will create a low 
economic value having a negative effect on the final ranking value.  In reality, most PEIs 
fall in the mid range of density and URC.  At the extremes very low density items are 
typically very expensive to repair creating a tradeoff within this term of the equation.  
The low density provides a high change in readiness for each unit repaired, however the 
high URC makes it very expensive to repair that one unit.  The ratio of these variables 
results in an economic utility value that competes with the rest of the PEIs.  This term 
interacts with target readiness (in the form of the coefficient) to create the final ranking 
value. 
The second driver of the model is target readiness.  Target readiness itself is 
derived from the WFV assigned to a PEI, and through the use of the readiness differential 
(target readiness less current readiness) the WFV determines the coefficient.  Assuming 
two PEIs with the same level of current readiness, their target readiness will impact how 
they are prioritized by the model.  The PEI with a higher target readiness will have a 
greater readiness differential and therefore a higher coefficient.  Given two PEIs with the 
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same economic utility, the PEI with the higher coefficient will be prioritized ahead of the 
lower coefficient.  However, when PEIs differ in economic utility, the interaction 
between economic utility and the coefficient determine where a PEI is prioritized by the 
model.  These interactions create another tradeoff.  A PEI with a high economic utility 
and high Cn (via a high target readiness and WFV), will have the highest final ranking 
value.  At the other extreme, a PEI with a low economic utility and low Cn will have the 
lowest final ranking value.  Most PEIs have some combination of economic utility and 
Cn that fall between these extremes.  The interaction of these variables uses economic 
utility and warfighter utility to objectively prioritize all PEIs. 
The third driver is current readiness.  Current readiness is a condition that is 
present at the time that the input data is collected.  Given a target readiness derived from 
the WFV, a lower current readiness will create a larger readiness differential resulting in 
a higher coefficient and a higher ranking value.  Based on the theory of diminishing 
marginal returns there is more utility in fixing PEIs with a lower current readiness than 
those with a higher current readiness, all other things being equal.  The piecewise linear 
curve utilized in this model was adopted from the original DERO model (DLMP 
Handbook, Marine Corps Logistics Command, p25). 
The fourth driver of the model is unserviceable returns.  The only impact USR has 
directly on the model is the formation of readiness bands (readiness bands are discussed 
in detail in the next section).  Once these bands are calculated, USRs no longer have any 
interaction with the utility algorithm.  However, USRs are a limiting factor for the simple 
fact that no matter how high the economic utility, nor how great the warfighter utility, a 
PEI cannot be selected for repair at the depot if it is not identified as available for turn in.   
 
C. READINESS BANDS 
Some further discussion is required to explain how quantities of a PEI are selected 
and prioritized by the model.  Shown below is the same coefficient chart that was 
discussed in Chapter III.    
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Figure 13.   Coefficient Piece-Wise Linear Curve 
 
Upon initial consideration by the model, a PEI falls on this curve based on its 
readiness differential, and is therefore assigned a corresponding coefficient (equal to the 
slope of that portion of the curve).  With coefficient ‘Cn’, once a PEI is selected by the 
model, that is once the PEI’s ranking value (∆R/URC)*Cn is greater than that of all other 
PEIs, it will remain greater until the readiness differential decreases (moving right on the 
curve to the next line segment) and the coefficient decreases.  In other words, once a PEI 
is selected by the model, the model will select a quantity of that PEI that creates an 
increase in readiness sufficient to move the readiness differential to the next line segment 
on the curve.  Once this occurs, the ranking value of the PEI decreases (as the coefficient 
in the calculation has now changed), and any further quantities of that PEI must compete 
against all other PEIs before being selected again.   
For example, if E0150 has an initial readiness differential of .29 (.88-.59), its 
corresponding initial coefficient is 14.  The ∆R/URC for this PEI is .0159 and will remain 
constant throughout the calculation.  The ranking value (using the utility algorithm 
(∆R/URC)*Cn) of this PEI is .223.  Once this PEI is selected by the model, the entire 
first readiness band of three is selected.  Once these three are repaired the new current 
readiness is .701 (the initial current readiness of .59 plus the increase of (3*.037) .111 
realized by repairing the first three units of this PEI).  With a new current readiness of 
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.701, the PEI’s readiness differential has decreased to .179 (.88-.701) placing it on a 
different segment (to the right) of the piece-wise curve.  After the first band of this PEI is 
selected and prioritized for repair, the next readiness band to be considered must now be 
calculated with a coefficient of 7 vice 14.  While the ∆R/URC remains constant at .0159, 
putting 7 into the equation as this PEI’s coefficient results in a new ranking value of .112.  
The next band of E0150 will not be selected for repair by the model until all other PEIs 
with a ranking value greater than .112 have been selected first.  To carry this example one 
step further, once E0150 is selected by the model again, it will select a quantity of three.  
This is the case because it will take an increase in readiness of three units (3*.037 = .111) 
to move the readiness differential (.88-(.701+.111) = .068) across the next line segment 
of the piece-wise curve, once again changing the coefficient from 7 to 3, and further 
reducing the ranking value.   
This grouping of quantities based on the piece-wise segment creates what the 
authors have termed readiness bands.  Readiness bands are groups of quantities of a PEI 
that will be selected for repair at the same time.  In other words, once the first unit is 
chosen, the entire readiness band will be chosen before the coefficient of the PEI is 
reduced requiring a recalculation of the ranking value.  The chart below shows a PEI with 
a large number of unserviceable returns available for repair at the Depot.  The quantity of 
USRs for this PEI creates readiness bands that stretch across all five of the possible 
coefficient values.   
TAMCN NOMEN URC AAO USR 
Tgt 
R Curr R ∆R R Diff Cn Value
D0235 
Semi-
Trlr     100             
D0235 
Semi-
Trlr 30,593 301 16 0.85 0.5980 0.0033 0.252 14 .152
D0235 
Semi-
Trlr 30,593 301 30 0.85 0.6512 0.0033 0.199 7 .076
D0235 
Semi-
Trlr 30,593 301 15 0.85 0.7508 0.0033 0.099 3 .033
D0235 
Semi-
Trlr 30,593 301 15 0.85 0.8007 0.0033 0.049 2 .022
D0236 
Semi-
Trlr 30,593 301 24 0.85 0.8505 0.0033 -0.001 0.5 .005
 
Table 9. Example of Readiness Bands 
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The total number of USRs for this PEI is 100.  With an initial readiness 
differential of .252, it takes a quantity of 16 to move the readiness differential from a 
coefficient of 14 to a coefficient of 7.  This quantity of 1 is the first readiness band for 
this PEI.  Once the ranking value of .152 becomes the highest value available across all 
PEIs the utility algorithm will select the first readiness band.  When the coefficient is 
reduced to 7, the ranking value is reduced to .076.  The next readiness band for this PEI 
will not be selected until all PEIs above .076 are selected.  When this band is selected, the 
entire quantity of 30 is selected together.  The number of readiness bands that exist for 
each PEI will be dependant on the number of USRs and the ∆R for that PEI.  High 
density PEIs like the PLGR may have a quantity of many hundreds in a single readiness 
band due to the small increase in readiness for repairing each unit.  Conversely, low 
density items like the radar discussed previously may only have a quantity of one or two 
in a readiness band due to the high change in readiness realized for repairing each unit.   
 
D. RESULTS 
Using the 30 PEIs selected in Chapter III, the utility algorithm has been run in 
spreadsheet format to demonstrate the output.  When observing final ranking values and 
priorities it must be remembered that this output is only significant given the exact input 
of these 30 sample PEIs.  Different WFVs (and therefore different target readiness), 
current readiness, and unserviceable returns will result in a different ranking.  Sensitivity 
to changes in input will be discussed in the next section.  The intent of this example is to 
illustrate the format and flexibility of the output.  For this example, the target readiness 
used in this model has been derived from the WFVs of the 30 sample TAMCNs using the 
linear method discussed in Chapter III.  Current readiness figures were pulled from 
MERIT, and the quantities of unserviceable returns for each PEI are fictional, chosen to 
show a wide range of potential readiness bands.   
 59
 










Interim Fast Attack 
Vehicle $50,000  80 12 0.91 0.5700 0.01250 0.0250 0.340 14 0.350 $600,000 
E3191 
Trainer, Handling 
Launch (Stinger) $4,483  171 4 0.79 0.7700 0.00585 0.1304 0.020 2 0.261 $617,932 
E0150 
Armored Vehicle, 
Launcher, Bridge $232,515  27 3 0.88 0.5900 0.03704 0.0159 0.290 14 0.223 $1,315,477 
A2635 Telephone Set $612  5383 38 0.85 0.7431 0.00019 0.0304 0.107 7 0.212 $1,338,735 
E0930 
Launch Simulator, 
Stinger $25,906  55 1 0.78 0.7273 0.01818 0.0702 0.053 3 0.211 $1,364,641 
A1440 
Radar Set, 
Firefinder $420,767  19 1 0.94 0.7368 0.05263 0.0125 0.203 14 0.175 $1,785,408 
A0966 
Mobile EW 
Support System  $307,613  13 1 0.93 0.7692 0.07692 0.0250 0.161 7 0.175 $2,093,021 
D1160 
Interim Fast Attack 
Vehicle $50,000  80 7 0.91 0.7200 0.01250 0.0250 0.190 7 0.175 $2,443,021 
D0235 
Semi-Trlr, Lowbed, 
40T $30,593  301 16 0.85 0.5980 0.00332 0.0109 0.252 14 0.152 $2,932,509 
E0930 
Launch Simulator, 
Stinger $25,906  55 2 0.78 0.7455 0.01818 0.0702 0.035 2 0.140 $2,984,321 
E0150 
Armored Vehicle, 
Launcher, Bridge $232,515  27 3 0.88 0.7011 0.03704 0.0159 0.179 7 0.112 $3,681,866 
A2635 Telephone Set $612  5383 82 0.85 0.7502 0.00019 0.0304 0.100 3 0.091 $3,732,055 
A1440 
Radar Set, 
Firefinder $420,767  19 1 0.94 0.7895 0.05263 0.0125 0.151 7 0.088 $4,152,822 
B2460 
Tractor, Full Tr 
(T5) $45,275  190 12 0.91 0.7368 0.00526 0.0116 0.173 7 0.081 $4,696,122 
D0235 
Semi-Trlr, Lowbed, 
40T $30,593  301 30 0.85 0.6512 0.00332 0.0109 0.199 7 0.076 $5,613,912 
A0966 
Mobile EW 
Support System  $307,613  13 1 0.93 0.8462 0.07692 0.0250 0.084 3 0.075 $5,921,525 
E1356 
Recharging Unit, 
Coolant, Trng $50,000  80 3 0.78 0.7000 0.01250 0.0250 0.080 3 0.075 $6,071,525 
E3191 
Trainer, Handling 
Launch (Stinger) $4,483  171 15 0.79 0.7934 0.00585 0.1304 -0.003 0.5 0.065 $6,138,770 
D0877 
Trlr, Powered, 
Wrecker/Recovery $215,369  115 4 0.91 0.6800 0.00870 0.0040 0.230 14 0.057 $7,000,246 
E1356 
Recharging Unit, 
Coolant, Trng $50,000  80 2 0.78 0.7375 0.01250 0.0250 0.043 2 0.050 $7,100,246 
E0150 
Armored Vehicle, 
Launcher, Bridge $232,515  27 1 0.88 0.8122 0.03704 0.0159 0.068 3 0.048 $7,332,761 
A2505 
Switchboard, 
Telephone, Auto $16,042  396 17 0.90 0.8081 0.00253 0.0157 0.092 3 0.047 $7,605,475 
B2086 
Storage Tank Mod 
Water (SixCon) $8,401  2016 173 0.88 0.6944 0.00050 0.0059 0.186 7 0.041 $9,058,848 
A1441 
Radar Set, 
Firefinder $420,767  19 1 0.94 0.8421 0.05263 0.0125 0.098 3 0.038 $9,479,615 
E0930 
Launch Simulator, 
Stinger $25,906  55 9 0.78 0.7818 0.01818 0.0702 -0.002 0.5 0.035 $9,712,769 
E0942 LAV, Anti-Tank $408,179  98 7 1.00 0.6100 0.01020 0.0025 0.390 14 0.035 $12,570,022 
D0235 
Semi-Trlr, Lowbed, 
40T $30,593  301 15 0.85 0.7508 0.00332 0.0109 0.099 3 0.033 $13,028,917 
A2505 
Switchboard, 
Telephone, Auto $16,042  396 20 0.90 0.8510 0.00253 0.0157 0.049 2 0.031 $13,349,757 
A1260 
Navigation Set, 
Satellite  PLGR $348  5015 400 0.86 0.9200 0.00020 0.0573 -0.060 0.5 0.029 $13,488,957 
A2306 
Sensor System 
Monitor, Mobile $482,469  22 1 0.93 0.8636 0.04545 0.0094 0.066 3 0.028 $13,971,426 
D0877 
Trlr, Powered, 
Wrecker/Recovery $215,369  115 11 0.91 0.7148 0.00870 0.0040 0.195 7 0.028 $16,340,485 
B1139 
Hose Reel System 




40T $30,593  301 15 0.85 0.8007 0.00332 0.0109 0.049 2 0.022 $16,984,017 
B1291 
Decontamination 
System, Ltwt $27,448  1224 55 0.88 0.7353 0.00082 0.0030 0.145 7 0.021 $18,493,657 
E0960 
Machine Gun, Lt, 
Squad, Auto Wpn $1,909  8066 83 0.92 0.8600 0.00012 0.0065 0.060 3 0.019 $18,652,104 
B2086 
Storage Tank Mod, 
Water (SixCon) $8,401  2016 101 0.88 0.7802 0.00050 0.0059 0.100 3 0.018 $19,500,605 
E0277 
Display Group, 
Data $6,293  453 52 0.81 0.8600 0.00221 0.0351 -0.050 0.5 0.018 $19,827,841 
D1092 
Trk, Maint, 
Telephone $143,000  22 3 0.82 0.8200 0.04545 0.0318 0.000 0.5 0.016 $20,256,841 
B1580 
Pump  Module, 
Fuel (SIXCON) $20,983  631 25 0.91 0.8716 0.00158 0.0076 0.038 2 0.015 $20,781,416 
D0879 
Trlr, Powered, 
30T, Cargo, Drop $160,023  326 10 0.88 0.7500 0.00307 0.0019 0.130 7 0.013 $22,381,646 
E0960 
Machine Gun, Lt, 
Squad, Auto Wpn $1,909  8066 416 0.92 0.8703 0.00012 0.0065 0.050 2 0.013 $23,175,790 
E0989 
Machine Gun, 
Medium, 7.62mm $3,031  5249 150 0.98 0.9400 0.00019 0.0063 0.040 2 0.013 $23,630,442 
D0877 
Trlr, Powered, 
Wrecker/Recovery,  $215,369  115 6 0.91 0.8104 0.00870 0.0040 0.100 3 0.012 $24,922,656 
B2086 
Storage Tank Mod, 
Water (SixCon) $8,401  2016 96 0.88 0.8303 0.00050 0.0059 0.050 2 0.012 $25,729,152 
B0589 Excavator, Combat $226,756  130 6 0.90 0.8077 0.00769 0.0034 0.092 3 0.010 $27,089,688 
E0947 
LAV, Light Assault, 
25mm $405,326  379 28 0.98 0.6600 0.00264 0.0007 0.320 14 0.009 $38,438,816 
B1291 
Decontamination 
System, Ltwt $27,448  1224 61 0.88 0.7802 0.00082 0.0030 0.100 3 0.009 $40,113,144 
E0856 AAV, Recovery $611,041  60 3 0.88 0.7900 0.01667 0.0027 0.090 3 0.008 $41,946,267 
A2505 
Switchboard, 
Telephone, Auto $16,042  396 13 0.90 0.9015 0.00253 0.0157 -0.002 0.5 0.008 $42,154,813 
A1503 
Radar Set, 3D, 
Long Range $7,429,900  13 2 0.88 0.6923 0.07692 0.0010 0.188 7 0.007 $57,014,613 
B0589 Excavator, Combat $226,756  130 4 0.90 0.8538 0.00769 0.0034 0.046 2 0.007 $57,921,637 
B1291 
Decontamination 
System, Ltwt $27,448  1224 62 0.88 0.8301 0.00082 0.0030 0.050 2 0.006 $59,623,413 
B1139 
Hose Reel System 
(HRS) $184,637  47 6 0.82 0.8298 0.02128 0.0115 -0.010 0.5 0.006 $60,731,235 
D0879 
Trlr, Powered, 
30T, Cargo, Drop $160,023  326 17 0.88 0.7807 0.00307 0.0019 0.099 3 0.006 $63,451,626 
E0856 AAV, Recovery $611,041  60 3 0.88 0.8400 0.01667 0.0027 0.040 2 0.005 $65,284,749 
D0235 
Semi-Trlr, Lowbed, 
40T $30,593  301 24 0.85 0.8505 0.00332 0.0109 0.000 0.5 0.005 $66,018,981 
E1888 
Tank, Combat, FT, 
120mm Gun $828,083  403 25 0.98 0.7200 0.00248 0.0003 0.260 14 0.004 $86,721,056 
D0879 
Trlr, Powered, 
30T, Cargo, Drop $160,023  326 5 0.88 0.8328 0.00307 0.0019 0.047 2 0.004 $87,521,171 
B1580 
Pump  Module, 
Fuel (SIXCON) $20,983  631 28 0.91 0.9112 0.00158 0.0076 -0.001 0.5 0.004 $88,108,695 
E0960 
Machine Gun, Lt, 
Squad, Auto Wpn $1,909  8066 101 0.92 0.9219 0.00012 0.0065 -0.002 0.5 0.003 $88,301,504 
D0080 
Chassis, Trlr, GP, 
3 1/2T, 2 Whl $8,697  2314 222 0.78 0.8000 0.00043 0.0050 -0.020 0.5 0.002 $90,232,238 
E1888 
Tank, Combat, FT, 
120mm Gun $828,083  403 1 0.98 0.7820 0.00248 0.0003 0.198 7 0.002 $91,060,321 
B1291 
Decontamination 
System, Ltwt $27,448  1224 22 0.88 0.8807 0.00082 0.0030 -0.001 0.5 0.001 $91,664,177 
E0856 AAV, Recovery $611,041  60 4 0.88 0.8900 0.01667 0.0027 -0.010 0.5 0.001 $94,108,341 
 
 
Table 10. Utility Algorithm Results 
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As seen in Table 10, the output of this model is displayed as a prioritized list of 
PEIs to be inducted into the depot.  The output of the model has been sorted by the final 
ranking value from highest to lowest.  A particular PEI may appear on this list as many as 
five times, depending on the number of readiness bands for that PEI.   
Given a constrained budget, a budget line can be drawn on this output, utilizing 
the cumulative total cost column.  All PEIs falling above the budget line are funded, all 
below are unfunded.  In the case that the budget falls within a readiness band (which will 
nearly always be the case), that band will be funded to the extent of the budget.  Any 
remaining money will be spent on the next highest priority that has a URC within the 
remaining budget.   
The assumption that ranking values alone should determine the priority for 
equipment induction, regardless of the size of the readiness band, is a heuristic that 
allows the priority list to be developed before the budget number is known with certainty; 
a useful characteristic.  Once a budget number is known, it is proposed that the ranking 
be used in a myopic fashion to determine which PEIs should be inducted for 
maintenance.  Myopic procedures work in a linear fashion, considering only the next item 
in a list – in this case, PEIs will be inducted in a myopic fashion, taking the next item in 
the list without any consideration of items further down on the list, until the budget is 
exhausted.  For any given budget amount however, a myopic procedure is heuristic, not 
optimal.  For example, assume a budget of $60 million on the sample output provided in 
Table 10.  This budget falls in the middle of a readiness band for B1139.  Funding a 
quantity of 2 (of the 6 USRs available) brings the total expenditure to $59,892,687.  
There is not enough money left to fund another unit of B1139.  Furthermore, there is not 
enough money to fund either of the next two PEIs on the prioritized list; D0879 with a 
URC of $160,023, and E0856 with a URC of $611,041.  This myopic procedure moves to 
the next prioritized readiness band affordable within the remaining budget.  In this case, 
D0235 is partially funded, virtually using the entire remaining budget.   
To prevent this problem, a linear program could be developed that would take the 
cost of each readiness band into consideration.  Such a linear program could be run 
against the ranked list after the budget numbers were announced.  This procedure has not 
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been included, first because it is outside the scope of this project, and second, because in 
practice the myopic nature of the proposed procedure will cause few problems.   
While heuristic, this output allows decision makers to see exactly what equipment 
will be dropped from the depots schedule in the event of a budget cut.  Conversely, 
planners can see exactly what assets to fund with budget plus ups.  Additionally, in the 
year of execution, as PEIs become unavailable for return to the depot (which occurs 
every year), decision makers are able to move down the prioritized list to determine what 
is the next best alternative.   
In order to interpret the results of this model, four PEIs have been selected from 
different portions of the list to examine why they were ranked as they were.   
TAMCN NOMENCLATURE URC AAO USR 
Tgt 




Diff Cn Value 
                        
D1160 
Interim Fast Attack 
Vehicle $50,000  80 12 0.91 0.57 0.0125 0.025 0.34 14 .350 
D1160 
Interim Fast Attack 
Vehicle $50,000  80 7 0.91 0.72 0.0125 0.025 0.19 7 .175 
 
Table 11. Explanation of Rankings; IFAV 
 
D1160 has been chosen because its first readiness band ranked first among all 
PEIs.  This PEI has a high target readiness (.91) derived from its WFV of .625.  The low 
current readiness (.57) caused a readiness differential of .34 which gives this readiness 
band a coefficient of 14.  The coefficient (representing the warfighter’s utility for this 
readiness band of this PEI) is then multiplied by the ∆R/URC (representing the economic 
utility to the Marine Corps of repairing this PEI).  This PEI has a mid-range URC and is a 
low density item, meaning that repairing a single unit has a significant increase in 
readiness (1.25% in this case).  This results in a relatively high economic utility, 
multiplied by the highest possible warfighter utility (for this readiness band), resulting in 
the highest final ranking value.  After selecting this readiness band, the readiness 
differential changes to .190, moving the next readiness band to the next segment of the 
piece-wise linear curve.  With a coefficient of 7, the final ranking value of the second 
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readiness band of D1160 is significantly less, and is not selected by the model until six 
other readiness bands of different PEIs have first been selected.   
This PEI demonstrates many of the properties of this model.  Recall that the 
economic utility does not change throughout the process.  The warfighter utility however, 
is reduced as readiness bands are selected and quantities of the PEI are repaired.  As this 
occurs the readiness differential gets smaller and the coefficient decreases.  As the 
coefficient decreases the final ranking value decreases, placing each subsequent readiness 
band of this PEI further down the prioritized list.   
 








Diff Cn Value 
A1503 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range $7,429,900 13 2 0.88 0.6923 0.07692 0.0010 0.188 7 .007 
 
Table 12. Explanation of Rankings; Long Range Radar 
 
A1503 has the most expensive unit repair cost of the sample list.  This PEI is also 
a low density item.  Repairing a single radar increases readiness of the PEI by 7.7%.  The 
economic utility of repairing this radar is a tradeoff between a large increase in readiness 
and a very high cost.  Given the current readiness of 69%, the readiness differential for 
the first readiness band of this PEI is 18.8%.  This places it on the portion of the piece-
wise linear curve with a slope of 7, resulting in a coefficient of 7.  In this case, the low 
economic utility combined with the relatively high warfighter utility places the first and 
only readiness band of this PEI 50th (of 64) on the prioritized list.   
 








Diff Cn Value 
A1260 
Navigation Set, 
Satellite Signal PLGR $348 5015 400 0.86 0.9200 0.00020 0.0573 -0.06 0.5 0.029 
 
Table 13. Explanation of Rankings; PLGR 
 
A1260 has the least expensive unit repair cost of the sample, but is one of the 
highest density items.  Repairing a single unit of this PEI only increases the readiness by 
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.002%.  This high density is offset by the low URC to create an economic utility that is 
relatively high.  With a current readiness of 92%, this PEI is already above its target 
readiness of 86% as determined by its WFV.  This negative readiness differential places 
the PEI on the farthest right portion of the piece-wise linear curve with a coefficient of .5.  
When multiplied by the economic utility value of .0573, this coefficient actually acts to 
penalize this PEI (multiplying by a fraction), which results in an even lower final ranking 
value.  This is a desired effect of the model since the PEI is already above its target 
readiness.  The combination of these factors places this readiness band (due to the high 
density, the entire 400 units fall into one readiness band) at 29th on the prioritized list.   
 








Diff Cn Value 
E0942 LAV, Anti-Tank $408,179 98 7 1.00 0.6100 0.01020 0.0025 0.390 14 .035 
 
Table 14. Explanation of Rankings; LAV-AT 
 
E0942 has been chosen because it has a target readiness of 100% based on its 
WFV of 1.  The economic utility of repairing this PEI is in the bottom half of the sample 
set.  This is due to the relatively high URC, and a moderate density level.  With a current 
readiness of 61% and a target readiness of 100%, the readiness differential of 39% falls 
on the portion of the piece-wise linear curve with a coefficient of 14.  This PEI will 
maintain a coefficient of 14 until enough units have been repaired to make the readiness 
differential less than 20%.  In this case, the readiness must reach 80% before the 
coefficient would drop to 7, lowering the final ranking value.  With an increase in 
readiness per unit repaired of 1.02%, the first readiness band for this PEI would be a 
quantity of 29.  However, there are only 7 LAV-ATs available to be turned in to the 
depot in this cycle. The entire value of 7 is selected 26th on the prioritized list.   
 
The purpose of examining these four PEIs was to understand exactly why they 
were prioritized as they were given these specific inputs.  The next section will examine 
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some of the same PEIs to illustrate how their placement on this prioritized list could 
change given a change in their inputs. 
 
E. SENSITIVITY 
One of the primary criticisms of the DERO model is the lack of sensitivity to 
differences in WFVs.  The following examples will show how the final ranking value is 
affected by changes to the inputs to the model.   
 








Diff Cn Value 
                        
A1503 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range $7,429,900 13 2 0.88 0.6923 0.07692 0.0010 0.188 7 .007 
                        
A1503 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range $7,429,900 13 1 0.92 0.6923 0.07692 0.0010 0.228 14 .014 
A1504 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range $7,429,900 13 1 0.92 0.7692 0.07692 0.0010 0.151 7 .007 
                        
A1503 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range $7,429,900 13 2 0.88 0.5400 0.07692 0.0010 0..34 14 .014 
 
Table 15. Sensitivity Analysis; Long Range Radar 
 
The first set of results shows the long range radar with the sample data entered in 
the model.  With this data the first and only readiness band was ranked 50th among the 
sample PEIs.  In the second set of results shown (highlighted in green), the target 
readiness has been changed from .88 to .92.  This change could occur for a number of 
reasons.  Chapter III discussed the attributes that are used to calculate a PEI’s WFV.  In 
this instance, if the WIRs for the radar increased, or if the unit requesting depot 
maintenance for this cycle was higher on the waterfall chart than in the past, the radar’s 
WFV would increase.  With a higher WFV, a corresponding increase in target readiness 
creates a larger readiness differential (given the same current readiness), resulting in a 
greater coefficient, in this case 14.  The economic utility of this PEI has not changed, but 
the warfighter’s utility has increased.  The resulting ranking value for the first readiness 
band is now .014, moving it from 50th on the sample prioritization to 40th.  This scenario 
would only select a quantity of one in the first readiness band.  The second readiness 
band with a coefficient of 7 would remain 50th on the prioritized list.   
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In the third set of results highlighted in yellow, the WFV has returned to .88, 
however the current readiness has been lowered to .54.  This example is meant to 
illustrate that a PEI with an extremely low current readiness will receive favorable 
treatment by the model.  With this low readiness level, the readiness differential becomes 
large (.34).  In this case, it is sufficiently large so that both of the unserviceable returns 
fall into the same readiness band and receive the highest coefficient of 14.  The resulting 
ranking value means that a quantity of two radars will be selected 40th on the prioritized 
list. 
 








Diff Cn Value 
A1260 
Navigation Set, Satellite Signals 
PLGR $348 5015 400 0.86 0.9200 0.00020 0.0573 -0.06 0.5 0.029 
A1261 
Navigation Set, Satellite Signals 
PLGR $348 5015 400 0.86 0.7800 0.00020 0.0573 0.08 3 0.172 
 
Table 16. Sensitivity Analysis; PLGR 
 
Once again due to its low URC, the PLGR has a high economic utility.  Also 
recall that because its current readiness was already higher than its target readiness, the 
coefficient was .5.  The result was a ranking value placing the PLGR 29th on the 
prioritized list.  In the second row, (highlighted in blue) the target readiness remains the 
same, but the current readiness has been decreased.  The result is a readiness differential 
that corresponds to a coefficient of 3.  Applying the algorithm, the PLGRs improved 
ranking value now places it 9th on the prioritized list.  A higher target readiness or a lower 
current readiness may increase the coefficient, raising the PEI even higher on the 
prioritized list.   
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has covered the utility algorithm, its inputs, outputs, and sensitivity 
to changes in inputs.  The four driving factors of this model interact to produce a 
prioritized list of PEIs that account for both economic and warfighter utility.  Utilizing 
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this method ensures that the Marine Corps is receiving a better return on its investment in 
the DLMP, driven by the needs of the warfighter.   
  




















































V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The premise of this project was to examine the DLMP process and make 
recommendations to address the dissatisfactions being voiced by the stakeholders.  The 
authors’ research revealed that the bulk of this dissatisfaction came from an optimization 
model that most stakeholders do not trust, nor do they believe it adequately reflects 
priorities that stakeholders value.  Specifically, the process of assigning warfighting 
values to PEIs, and the effect those warfighting values have on the model’s output are 
thought to be inadequate.  In addition, the proprietary software used to run the DERO 
model (which is not licensed on NMCI) and the inflexibility of the output produced by 
the model complicate the process beyond reason.   
Utilizing stakeholder interviews, best business practices, and academic research, 
the authors present the following three proposed solutions to improve the process.  Each 
recommendation builds on its predecessor with the first being the least intrusive to the 
current process, and the third being a completely different model.   
1. Utilize the multivariable approach defined in Chapter III to develop 
warfighting values that are significantly differentiated, relevant to the needs of 
the warfighter, and are capable of changing with the current situation and the 
evolving needs of the Corps. 
2. Based on these warfighting values, implement the method defined in Chapter 
III to create a target readiness for each PEI, rather than the common target 
readiness for all PEIs that is currently used. 
3. In place of the DERO model, utilize the utility algorithm described in Chapter 
IV to prioritize PEIs based on the combination of economic and warfighter 
utility. 
The pros and cons of each of these proposals are discussed below. 
 
A. WARFIGHTING VALUES 
The first proposal is to continue using the DERO model; however, it is 
recommended to assign WFVs using the method described in Chapter III.  Using the 
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prescribed approach to developing WFVs has a number of advantages over the current 
process.  The first advantage is the scale.  The proposed method has a continuous range 
from .00 to 1.00 while the current method is limited to the discrete set {1,2,3,4}.  The 
large range under the proposed method allows for greater differentiation between PEIs.  
This differentiation has the potential to have a much greater effect on the output of the 
DERO model.  The scale of the WFVs proposed in this report requires further analysis to 
determine their effect on the DERO model.  The second advantage is the increased 
exposure to factors such as the life cycle stage of the PEI and the needs of deployed or 
high priority units.  Utilizing four diverse attributes creates a more relevant WFV than the 
current practice of using four similar characterizations.  Related to the diversity of the 
attributes used to determine WFVs is the fact that two of the four attributes have the 
potential to change every cycle making the WFVs dynamic and allowing them to best 
support current and near term priorities.   
A disadvantage of the proposed method of assigning WFVs is the increased labor 
required to gather data and recalculate the WFVs each cycle.  Under the current system 
the WFVs do not change therefore no time is spent on this part of the process.  Under the 
proposed system, each PEI will require a calculation to obtain the ratio of the quantity of 
WIRs to AAO.  An additional adjustment is necessary based on which unit is providing 
the USR, and where the unit is prioritized in the waterfall chart during that cycle.  
However, in the authors’ opinion, the recalculation of the factors related to WFVs in each 
cycle is also a strength of the proposed procedure; it merely recognizes the fact that 
WFVs are dynamic, and does depend on the current environment.  Failure to recalculate 
the WFV may save time, but it will also produce a result that fails to use the best 
available information to adequately account for the warfighter’s utility.  Another 
disadvantage is that this recommendation does not address the DERO models disregard 
for economic considerations such as the cost of repairing PEIs.  Finally, this approach 
does not address the current policy of maintaining an 85% target readiness across all 




B. TARGET READINESS 
The second proposal is to continue utilizing the DERO model utilizing the WFVs 
in proposal one to create a range of target readiness.  The current process assigns a target 
readiness of 85% to every PEI.  The proposed method links target readiness to WFVs 
where the PEIs with the highest WFVs are assigned the highest target readiness.  
Assigning a target readiness between 75% and 100% is another way of differentiating 
between PEIs within the model to ensure that limited depot dollars are spent in the best 
interest of the warfighter.  Setting the target readiness of every PEI to 85% implies that 
the utility of all PEIs is equal.   
A disadvantage to this proposal is that in addition to recalculating WFVs each 
cycle, target readiness must be recalibrated to coincide with the new WFVs.  This process 
will require additional time in preparation for the DLMP requirements conference.  
Again, however, this additional labor is required to adequately reflect changes in 
priorities that occur between cycles.  Simply stating a blanket 85% readiness target may 
save time, but it does not reflect current priorities.   
Moreover, the procedure outlined, while systematic, is heuristic.  The heuristic 
nature of this process can be seen in the somewhat arbitrary way that WFVs are 
partitioned to create target readiness levels.  
As a potential solution to this concern, citations to procedures that can guarantee 
an improvement in the target readiness partitions have been provided.  Developing such a 
code, though it might save time by automating target readiness determination, would 
further complicate the process.  Development of this partitioning code has not been 
included, both because it was determined to be outside the scope of this project, but also 
because the partitioning heuristic utilized provides an adequate and less complex 
solution.   
Another disadvantage is that neither this second proposal nor the first addresses 
the issue of economic utility.  Given a limited budget, the Marine Corps would be 
missing an opportunity to ensure that it gets the greatest return on investment from depot 
level maintenance if it did not adopt a method that considers economic utility.   
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C. UTILITY ALGORITHM 
The third proposal calls for the most dramatic change to the current process.  This 
proposal recommends that the DERO model be replaced by the utility algorithm 
presented in Chapter IV. 
The utility algorithm utilizes inputs that are easily understood, both in their origin 
and their effect on the model.  The biggest fundamental difference between the DERO 
model and the utility algorithm is the consideration of repair cost when deciding what 
PEIs to fund with a limited budget.  The DERO model strives to achieve the fastest 
increase in readiness given a budget.  That is, it selects PEIs with the lowest levels of 
readiness and chooses them to be funded until it runs out of money.  There is no 
consideration of what less expensive opportunities are being forgone by repairing 
expensive PEIs.  The utility algorithm strives to achieve the largest increase in readiness 
per budget dollar spent.  That is, the algorithm searches for the most efficient increases in 
readiness, and then combines them with the needs of the warfighter to produce the 
prioritized funded list.   
One of the biggest advantages of the utility algorithm is the format and flexibility 
of its output.  The utility algorithm places banded quantities of each PEI in a prioritized 
list from first to last.  This format allows decision makers to see exactly what equipment 
will be funded at any level of budget appropriation.  Requests for supplemental funding 
can easily be justified with the prioritized list of PEIs, showing exactly what will be 
repaired with the additional funds.  Additionally changes in asset availability at the time 
of execution can be dealt with quickly and efficiently by moving to the next item on the 
prioritized list.  
Finally the use of Microsoft Excel to run the model allows this process to occur 
on NMCI supported computers.  Results can easily be displayed so that stakeholders can 
see the contribution of economic utility and warfighter utility to the final ranking value, 
and have a genuine understanding of the results that they are presented with.   
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A disadvantage of the utility algorithm is that it is a significant departure from the 
current process.  The change will likely meet resistance from stakeholders ingrained in 
the current process.   
Another disadvantage of this model is the potentially prohibitive effect of extreme 
unit repair costs.  PEIs with high AAOs and extremely high URCs do not receive a 
favorable ranking in this model.  Specifically, tanks (AAO 403, URC $828,083) do not 
compete well due to the very low economic utility of repairing these assets.  The authors 
believe that these objective rankings accurately reflect the economic and warfighting 
utility of these assets.  However, if stakeholders feel that the procedure is biased against 
high-dollar-value URC items, this effect can be easily negated by adjusting the (unit) 
weight of the ∆R/URC in the model to reduce the importance of economic utility, or by 
incorporating another sub factor into the WFV to give more weight to such PEIs.   
 
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion is a brief discussion on how the proposed solutions have addressed 
the problems identified with the DLMP. 
First a new method for calculating Warfighting Values has been proposed.  This 
method gives stakeholders the opportunity to use a variety of attributes to ensure that the 
final WFV reflects the needs of the warfighter.  Stakeholders are able to understand why 
a PEI has a particular WFV, and most importantly, know that the WFV has an impact on 
the output of the model.  Second, the output of the Utility Algorithm is presented in a 
manner that is easily interpreted by those on the outside of the process, and easily 
executed by those who work within the process.  Finally, the combination of warfighter’s 
utility, economic utility, and diminishing marginal returns utilized in the Utility 
Algorithm provide the Marine Corps with an improved return on investment, and the 






























Ranking of Economic Utility for the Sample Set 
 
 
TAMCN NOMENCLATURE ∆R/URC* 
E3191 Trainer, Handling GM Launch (Stinger) 0.1304 
E0930 Launch Simulator, Stinger 0.0702 
A1260 Navigation Set, Satellite Signals PLGR 0.0573 
E0277 Display Group, Data 0.0351 
D1092 Trk, Maint, Telephone 0.0318 
A2635 Telephone Set 0.0304 
A0966 Mobile EW Support System PIP 0.0250 
D1160 Interim Fast Attack Vehicle 0.0250 
E1356 Recharging Unit, Coolant, Trng 0.0250 
E0150 Armored Vehicle, Launcher, Bridge 0.0159 
A2505 Switchboard, Telephone, Automatic 0.0157 
A1440 Radar Set, Firefinder 0.0125 
B2460 Tractor, Full Tr (T5) 0.0116 
B1139 Hose Reel System (HRS) 0.0115 
D0235 Semi-Trlr, Lowbed, 40T 0.0109 
A2306 Sensor System Monitor, Mobile 0.0094 
B1580 Pump  Module, Fuel (SIXCON) 0.0076 
E0960 Machine Gun, Lt, Squad, Auto Wpn 0.0065 
E0989 Machine Gun, Medium, 7.62mm 0.0063 
B2086 Storage Tank Module, Water (SixCon) 0.0059 
D0080 Chassis, Trlr, GP, 3 1/2T, 2 Whl 0.0050 
D0877 Trlr, Powered, Wrecker/Recovery, 4X5 0.0040 
B0589 Excavator, Combat 0.0034 
B1291 Decontamination System, Ltwt 0.0030 
E0856 AAV, Recovery 0.0027 
E0942 LAV, Anti-Tank 0.0025 
D0879 Trlr, Powered, 30T, Cargo, Dropside 0.0019 
A1503 Radar Set, 3D, Long Range 0.0010 
E0947 LAV, Light Assault, 25mm 0.0007 
E1888 Tank, Combat, FT, 120mm Gun 0.0003 
 
 




















































Utility Algorithm Formulas 
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This table shows the formulas that are entered in the Utility Algorithm spreadsheet.  The 
following is a description of the cells that contain a formula. 
 
G3.  Cell G3 is the current readiness of the second readiness band for this PEI.  The 
formula takes the initial current readiness plus the increase in readiness realized when the 
first readiness band is repaired.  
 
H2.  Cell H2 is the change in readiness realized by repairing a single unit of this PEI.  
The increase in readiness is 1/AAO. 
 
I2.  Cell I2 is the change in readiness divided by the unit repair cost, also known as the 
economic utility. 
 
J2.  Cell J2 is the readiness differential, which is the target readiness minus the current 
readiness. 
 
K2.  Cell K2 is the coefficient.  This formula is a series of “IF, THEN” statements that 
determine the coefficient based on the readiness differential in cell J2.   
 
L2.  Cell L2 is the final ranking value.  This value is the product of the economic utility 
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